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Control of the seas can mean peace. Control of
the seas can mean victory. If there is any lesson
of the twentieth century, especially of the last
few years , it is that in spite of the advancement
in space and in air, this country must still move
easily and safely across the seas of the world.
Knowledge of the oceans is more than a matter of
curiosity, our very survival may hinge on it.-*-
An increase in the growth of the world's popu-
lation coupled with new technology is placing intense
pressure on the development of ocean resources. In
order to establish peaceful methods for utilizing these
resources the United Nations convened the Third Law of
the Sea Conference in Caracas, Venezuela during the
summer of 197M-. One of the key questions that the
Conference failed to reach agreement on was the width
2
of the territorial seas and the right to unimpeded
passage through these waters when they form part of the
3
sea known as an "international strait."
From a speech made by John F. Kennedy aboard
the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in 1963, cited by
Hanson Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Harper
£ Rowe, 1970), p. 292.
The territorial sea is measured from the low
water line or "baseline" to some distance seaward that
the state declares as the width of its territorial sea.
See Appendix A.
o
Chapter I provides a detailed discussion of

Repeated failure to agree on a satisfactory
international regime for territorial seas and interna-
tional straits is associated with the differing concep-
tions of "national security" held by nations. Since
the end of World War II , nations have tended to expand
their national sovereignty over the seas that border
their coasts. In addition, there has been an increase
in the number of sovereign states , each with its own
claim upon the sea. The cause for the seaward stretch
of national sovereignty is economic but often defended
in terms of being essential to the security of the
nation. The extension of state sovereignty into areas
that were formerly "res nullius" has brought many of
the nations of the world into conflict. This is par-
ticularly true where a state's seaward boundary encom-
passes transit routes for world shipping and air
what is meant by the term "international strait." In
general, the term can be taken to mean any narrows con-
necting the high seas and used for communications by
more than one state.
There are probably as many definitions of
"national security" as there are authors writing on the
subject. A good survey of the various views held can
be found in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, National Security Policy and the Changing
World Power Alignment , Hearings before the Subcommittee
on National Security Policy and Scientific Development ,
92nd Cong., 2nd sess., May-August 1972.
The number went from 55 to today's 138.

communications, most typically at the focal points of
international straits.
This study will attempt to examine the rela-
tionship between national security considerations and
freedom for unimpeded passage through international
straits. The analysis will be pursued from the per-
spective of U.S. national policy as set forth for the
United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference, con-
vened in the summer of 1974.
There are two major aspects of the policy that
deserve study. First, what is the policy and what are
the domestic political issues involved in its forma-
tion? This leads to an examination of the question of
how the national security of the United States is seen
to be involved in unimpeded passage through inter-
national straits. The policy has been attacked domes-
tically as favoring Department of Defense interests
The "non-negotiable" position of the U.S. was
that acceptance of expanded territorial seas to a width
of 12 miles was contingent upon the right of free or
unimpeded passage through international straits and an
overall settlement of issues. "Statement by the Honor-
able John Norton Moore, Chairman of the NSC Interagency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea, on the occasion of
oversight Hearings on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-
committee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International
Law." (Mimeographed.) March 14, 1974, p. 4. Here-




over that of more important considerations , specifi-
cally, an international agreement on the development
of resources in the ocean. What evidence is there
that other interests have been subordinated to Defense
Department policy?
In addition to the domestic significance of
American policy for the international law of the sea,
another aspect is how has the U.S. policy been received
in the arena of international politics? American
policy would place the interest of world shipping and
air communications, both civil and military, over the
sovereign rights that a state has over its territory.
Is there any basis in international law for such a
position? Does international law provide any guidance
in solving the dilemma that arises when the national
security requirements of one state adversely affect the
national security requirements of other states?
The thesis of this paper is that the national
security interests of America and the peace of the
world are best served through unimpeded passage of
international straits. The thesis will be advanced by
1Two opponents have been S. Brown and L. Fabian,
"Diplomats at Sea," Foreign Affairs 52 (January 1974):
320.

setting forth the U.S. policy, the objections to that
policy, and the facts supporting that policy.
The work is organized into four chapters and
a conclusion. It will first be necessary to examine
the policy of the United States toward the international
law of the sea, and the domestic and foreign objections
to it. This will be accomplished in the first chapter
of the paper. The second chapter will be devoted to
establishing the views which oppose domestic critics.
The third chapter will attempt to answer the objections
of foreign opponents of American policy, particularly
as they pertain to international law. Fourth, a syn-





The Department of Defense should be called
upon, in executive session if necessary, to explain
the basis for Article II [free transit through
international straits as proposed in U.S. Draft
Articles for the Third Law of the Sea Conference]
in terms of national security and to explain the
basis of making Article II a non-negotiable element
of United States oceans policy.
^
The notion of "free transit" through straits
which form part of the territorial sea is unknown
to state practice and cannot offer an adequate
solution to the problem [balancing interests]
,
because it would alter the existing balance of
interests between the coastal and noncoastal
states , and derogate the sovereignty of the former
over their territorial seas.
2
Background
What is meant by the term "international
strait"? The most exhaustive work on the international
straits was done by a Dane, Erik Briiel , who wrote a
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Law of the Sea and Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
beds, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements , 92nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
April 10 S 11, 1972, p. 77.
2Jose A. de Yturriaga, "Navigation through the
Territorial Sea Including Straits Used for Inter-
national Navigation," Hazards of Maritime Transit,
ed. T. A. Clingan and L. M. Alexander (Cambridge, Mass.
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1973), p. 87.

treatise on the subject just prior to the outbreak of
World War II. Briiel investigated both the linguistic
and geographic definition of the term "strait." Lin-
guistically, a strait has the characteristics of
"passage," "narrowness," and "separation." Geographi-
cally speaking a strait must first be part of the sea
(this would eliminate man-made canals such as the Kiel
,
Suez, and Panama). Secondly, it must connect two
bodies of water which otherwise would be separated
either totally or to a great extent in that particular
locale. Third, it must be narrower than adjoining
waters and must separate two areas of land. Most
important for Briiel, and for our particular analysis is
the function that the strait serves. If a strait func-
tions as a means of communication by more than a single
state, then it is international in character and becomes
an "international" strait and subject to international
, 2law.
Erik Briiel, International Straits: A Treatise





A few examples will support the importance
which Briiel attached to the function of a strait in
determining its international character. The easiest
and most economical crossing between two land areas
that are separated by the sea is at the point where the
two masses are closest together. Ferrying stations are
established at these places. A state may have both

Briiel did not consider the number of ship pas-
sages important in determining the international char-
acter of a strait . He was supported in this by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Albanian
government argued before the ICJ in 1949 that the Corfu
Channel was not an international strait because it was
of minor importance to international commerce. The
decision of the International Court of Justice is
instructive when one seeks a definition of an inter-
national strait, viz.
sides of the strait within its jurisdiction, such as
Turkey and the Dardanelles. However, this crossing
point is significant to countries adjacent to it and
the economies of countries far removed. Reflection
upon the importance of the Turkish straits to past
European commerce with the orient will support this
.
Straits are also the focus of attention and
action when shores are under the jurisdiction of dif-
fert nations, either in time of war or time of peace.
The English Channel was of equal importance when it
protected England from French invasion during the
Napoleonic Wars, and when it provided the easiest inva-
sion route for the Allies when driving the German
armies out of France in World War II. Its prominence
has not diminished in times of peace, as witnessed by
the joint Anglo-French efforts at establishing a
"Chunnel" under it for the promotion of commerce
between the two countries.
Straits function as a natural focal point for
sea and airborne commerce . Ships and planes of many
nations often require their use. Straits can thus
affect not only the economy of the state or states who
have jurisdiction over the area where they are located
but the economy of the nation whose flag the craft
flies, the nation from which the goods are being
shipped, and the nation who will receive the goods.

It may be asked whether the test [for an inter-
national strait] is to be found in the volume of
traffic passing through the strait or in its
greater or lesser importance for international
navigation. But in the opinion of the Court the
decisive criterion is rather its geographical
situation as connecting two parts of the high seas
and the fact of its being used for international
navigation. -1-
Combining the important aspects of the various
concepts of an international strait, one might find the
following definition acceptable. An international
strait is a natural narrows connecting two parts of
the high seas and used for communication by two or
more states.
There is no generally agreed upon list of
international straits. Appendix B is a list of straits
and channels, some of which would be clearly "inter-
national straits," others might be questionable.
However, based upon our definition, it would be diffi-
cult to deny the international character of the below
o
listed straits. These straits are arranged in order
of decreasing number of ship passages per year:
L. C. Green, International Law through the
Cases (London: Stevens £ Sons, Ltd., 1970), p. 261.
2
R. D. Hodgson and T. V. Mclntyre, "Maritime
Commerce in Selected Areas of High Concentration,"
hazards of Maritime Transit, pp. 1-17.
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1. English Channel/Strait of Dover (110,000)
2. Danish Straits (40,000-50,000)
3. Strait of Hormuz (36,500)
4. Strait of Gibraltar (18,000 before the
closing of the Suez Canal)
5. The Dardanelles/Bosporus (at least 10,000)
6. Singapore/Malacca (10,000)
7. Mozambique Channel (at least 7,500)
To this list could be added the following, although




9. Strait of Florida
10. Windward Passage
Appendix C provides a general idea of the location of
these major international straits.
International straits have historically played
an important role in the security of nations. The
Iliad of Homer, written about 800 B.C., describes the
destruction of Troy or "Ilium" situated in the center
of a fertile plain on the southern shore of the
Hellespont (now the Dardanelles) in northwest Asia
Minor. At the time of its destruction (approximately
1200 B.C.), Troy controlled access to the rich wheat
growing regions of the Crimea. It was natural that it
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began collecting toll charges from ships sailing to and
from the Black Sea. It is commonly held by historians
that:
Troy perished not because of a beautiful woman . . .
but probably because of trade rivalries between the
Trojans and the Achaean peoples of the Greek main-
land. 1
Historical examples may be cited in connection
with other straits. During the Napoleonic Wars, France
pressured Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia to
pledge themselves to an armed neutrality against
England. Denmark's participation was especially
damaging to England. British warships were dependent
upon naval stores originating from the Baltic. These
stores had to pass through the Danish Straits to reach
England. In order to assure their passage, British
warships attacked Copenhagen in October of 1801 and
2forced the Danes into a treaty with England.
Hitler's decision to invade Norway and Denmark
in 1940 was based upon the fear that the Allies would
gain control of the Danish Straits, thus blockading the
Baltic. This would stop 11,000,000 of Germany's
^The World Book Encyclopedia , 1965 ed., s.v.
"Troy," by John H. Kent.
2 Lynn Montross, War through the Ages (New York:
Harper S Rowe , 1960), pp. 492-4 95.
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15,000,000 ton annual requirement for iron ore which
was shipped from Narvik through the Danish Straits.
It should be noted that Denmark had opened the straits
to free passage of shipping, even warships, in 1913.
One final example , concerning the Strait of
Tiran , should serve to illustrate that the controversy
over international straits has continued to relatively
recent times. In 19 55, Egypt, who together with Saudi
Arabia, controls the entrance to the strait leading to
the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Elath
,
put
into effect a regulation requiring all ships which
desired to pass through the straits to obtain permis-
sion 72 hours in advance. Israel, who receives about
2half her petroleum imports through Elath, and who
already was outraged by Egyptian interference with its
shipping, reacted by launching a military offensive.
Israeli troops invaded the Sinai Peninsula and seized
• 3Egyptian positions at Sham al Shaikh and Ras Nuzrani





United States Department of the Interior,
Minerals Yearbook, 1971, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 439-440.
Charles B. Selak, Jr., "A Consideration of the
Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba," American Journal of
International Law 52 (October 1958): 670-671.
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A general pattern of conflict emerges from the
historical examples just cited. First, coastal states
situated on the shores of international straits will
use their favorable geographical position for their
maximum political and economic advantage. Secondly,
such actions by coastal states often conflict with the
use of the strait by maritime nations. These nations
see use of the straits as vital to their national
security. This situation has often led to military
action against the coastal state, which obviously is
detrimental to that nation's security. Third, as in
the case of the Nazi invasion of Denmark or the Israeli
invasion of Egypt, present international law does not
provide adequate protection for the national security
interests of either the strait or maritime states.
Fourth, referring to the attack on Copenhagen in 1801,
a state may become involved in the conflict of more
powerful states if its mere location is upon an inter-
national strait essential to these powers' interests.
Certain recent events , other than the Arab-
Israeli clash over the Strait of Tiran , have led to a
renewal of interest in the international straits.
Technological advances have enabled states to utilize
the resources of the sea that before were beyond their
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capabilities. Technology has also increased life-span
as well as reducing the death rate. This has contrib-
uted to the doubling of the world population within the
2last 50 years.
Two important developments were in drilling
technology and seabed extraction. New deep sea drilling
techniques allow core samples to be taken from depths as
great as 20,000 ft. However, in order to exploit the
wells, a "tower" must be built whose depth limitation
is in the range of 400 to 450 feet. (Frank J. Berry,
"Oil and Gas Interests on the Shelf," Law of the Sea:
International Rules and Organization for the Sea, ed
.
L. M. Alexander [Kingston, R.I.: University of Rhode
Island, 1969], p. 228.) Even this limitation may soon
be overcome by the use of a completely submerged well
head which is presently under development.
There have been three devices recently devel-
oped which are capable of lifting Manganese nodules
from the seabed; "vacuuming," "scooping," and "air-
lifting." The latter was developed by Tenneco , Inc.
which invested 18 million dollars in its development.
The air-lift method has successfully recovered nodules
from 3,000 feet of water. (George A. Doumani , Ocean
Wealth: Policy and Potential [Rochelle Park, N.J.:
Hayden Book Co., Inc., 1973], pp. 37-38.)
The Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future, Population and the American Future
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).
This Presidential Commission stated that the world's
population went from 1/2 billion in 1650 to 1 1/2
billion by 1900. From 1900 to 1950 the population
climbed to 2 1/2 billion, and by 1970 had surpassed
3 1/2 billion. From the year 1 A.D. to 1650 A.D. the
world's population increased on the average of 150,000
persons per year. Today that figure has increased to
78,000,000 per year. It has been estimated that one
billion will be added to the world's population each
year by this time next century.
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Furthermore, in order to protect the sea's
resources for use by its own increasing number of
citizens, states have adopted a policy of extending
their jurisdiction over portions of the sea. Some
states, such as the United States, have adopted a func-
tional approach to such extensions. Others, notably
the Latin American countries , have unilaterally
extended their territorial waters seaward claiming all
within, on, and above to be within their sovereign
jurisdiction. By 1969, five states had claimed terri-
torial seas out to 200 miles from their coastlines
(see Appendix E).
The seriousness of extended claims to the seas
for international commerce can be illustrated. By
extending territorial seas from the traditional three
miles to twelve miles, 116 straits that formerly had
avenues of high seas through them would now find them-
selves entirely within the territorial seas of states
Some states, such as Argentina, have modified
their claim so as "not to affect freedom of navigation
or of air traffic." Argentina Law No. 17, 094-M 24 of
29 December, 1966 cited in United Nations, Legislative
Series, National Legislation and Treaties Relating to
the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Conti-
nental Shelf, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the Sea, ST/LEG/
SER. B/15, April 1970, p. 45.
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and subject to their control. A 200 mile extension
would place 35 percent of the entire ocean area within
the coastal states' jurisdiction.
In addition to the territorial sea expansion
for procuring the ocean resources for the use of a
state, another concept was growing in popularity by the
end of the 1950s. Archipelago states, states whose
land mass consists mostly of islands
,
began claiming
that the ocean area between their islands should be
considered "internal waters" and therefore under their
sovereign control. This claim had serious consequences
for international commerce. Some of these areas, such
as the Sunda Strait , held international shipping
routes
.
Additional events made coastal states more
zealous than ever in guarding their rights in terri-
torial waters , especially those forming the heavily
trafficked international straits. The capture of the
1 Letter from LCDR Dennis F. McCoy, JAGC , USN
,
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, 14 February 1974.
2 Brown and Fabian, p. 307.
o
Sayre A. Swarztrauber , The Three-Mile Limit of
Territorial Seas (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute
Press, 1972), p. 190. Internal waters are those waters
landward of the Baseline. See Appendix A.
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U.S.S. Pueblo off the coast of Korea made coastal states
conscious of the intelligence gathering capabilities of
ships off their coasts. The Torrey Canyon disaster
alerted states to the danger of pollution from ship-
wreck or collision from the new supertankers engaged in
innocent passage through their waters. Finally, the
crash of a U.S. plane carrying nuclear devices off the
coast of Palma made coastal states aware not only of the
danger presented by air traffic over their waters, but
to the danger presented by their cargos (either in the
form of weapons or nuclear propulsion plants) operating
within their claimed jurisdiction.
Providing more stimulus for the interest of
states in international straits and national security
was the increasing dependence of developed countries on
imported raw materials. Some of their economies and
their security depend heavily upon the cheap and unin-
terrupted supply of these materials. Even the United
States has a growing dependency on imports. Ninety
percent of its bulk commerce is carried in the holds of
ships. In petroleum requirements alone the U.S. is
•Address by VADM Robert Baldwin, USN ("A Navy
Perspective of Current World Crisis") before the World




becoming increasingly dependent upon imports. In 1972
such imports amounted to 27 percent of domestic demand
and by 1985 they will increase to 52 percent. Almost
the entire amount must come by sea.
In an unsuccessful effort to solve the problem
of expanded claims of national sovereignty over the
seas , the United Nations convened three Law of the Sea
Conferences. The dates of these major conferences
were 1958, 1960, and 1974. All three conferences
failed to find a consensus as to what the limit of
state sovereignty should be at sea and over what. In
addition, the scope and number of delegates for these
conferences have been expanding making agreement ever
more difficult. The original issues of breadth of the
territorial seas, fishing, and mineral rights were to
be solved by the, then, eighty-three member nations of
the United Nations at the first Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. The conference agenda was expanded to over 100
items to be resolved by the 148 participating delega-
2
tions of the third conference.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Strategic Petroleum Reserves
,
Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 45, 93rd Cong., 1st sess.,
1973, p. 448.
2
"Sea Treaty Near, Policy Chief Says," San




It was against this setting of international
events that the formation of present U.S. policy for
the oceans and the use of international straits was
taking place. It is important to the understanding of
the relationship between international straits and
national security to investigate the policy of the
leading maritime country of the world and how that
policy has been formed.
Prior to the late 1960s, U.S. policy for the
law of the sea was largely formed within the State
Department and White House. By 1968 it was realized
that major seabed oil deposits were generally to be
found upon the continental shelf. The National Petro-
leum Council, through the Department of the Interior,
began urging the State Department to adopt a 200 mile
territorial sea limit in order to protect these petro-
leum deposits from foreign encroachment. The deposits,
it was argued, were vital to national security. In
this they were opposed by the Department of Defense
which favored a narrow territorial sea as being best
for national security interests.
1Ann L. Hollick, "Seabeds Make Strange Poli-
tics," Foreign Policy, Winter 1972-1973, pp. 148-170
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In order to resolve this bureaucratic conten-
tion two actions were taken. First, a National Security
Study Memorandum (NSSM) was issued in July of 1969. The
NSSM provided for the establishment of an Under Secre-
taries' Committee in the case that agreement could not
be reached between State, Defense, and Interior as to
what national policy for the sea should be. Secondly,
an Inter-agency Law of the Sea Task Force was estab-
lished in 1970. This Task Force was under the direction
of State Department Legal Advisor John Stevenson and
was to coordinate all activities associated with U.S.
policy on the law of the sea at the bureau level.
By late 1970 the process by which U.S. policy
for the use of the ocean and the law of the sea was
established. First, the Inter-agency Law of the Sea
Task Force tried to reach agreement between the agen-
cies concerned which by that time included not only
State, Defense, and Interior, but Commerce, Bureau of
the Budget, Justice, Transportation, and the National
Science Foundation. Secondly, disagreements would be
sent to the Under Secretaries' Committee, chaired at
that time by Elliot Richardson. Third, recommendations




Security Council under the direction of the President's
Special Assistant, Henry Kissinger, for review and
consideration by the President. This procedure seems
to have continued until the Caracas Conference, with
one modification. In 1972 an Advisory Committee on the
Law of the Sea was formed. This committee was made up
of representatives of U.S. industry that were concerned
with the law of the sea negotiations taking place
within the United Nations. Originally formed at the
behest of the petroleum and minerals industry, its
mission was to assure that the head of the U.S. Delega-
tion to the United Nations Seabed Committee was made
2
aware of industry's needs.
National Policy
The importance which the United States' policy
makers placed on passage through the international
straits can be best determined by seeing how well this
issue faired against competing interests. One method
Hollick, from whom most of this information
has been taken, has given an accurate account of the
policy formation mechanism. This was confirmed in an
interview with a primary source, Capt . William Lynch,
JAGC, USN, former Action Officer for the Navy Depart-
ment on Law of the Sea Matters, San Diego, California,
14 September 1974.
2
Ann L. Hollick, "United States Ocean Politics,"
San Diego Law Review 10 (May 1973): 467-501.
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to do this is through examination of what U.S. policy
was for the Third Law of the Sea Conference. As has
been seen, the mechanism established for reaching this
policy provided for inputs from all major interests.
Although there were over 100 agenda items for
the Third Law of the Sea Conference, a seven-fold divi-
sion of them could be made. The seven major areas of
concern for which the U.S. was to develop a policy
were: (1) the breadth of the territorial sea and
unimpeded passage through and over international
straits, (2) living resource management, (3) mineral
v
resources of the continental shelf, (4) mineral
resources of the deep seabed, (5) protection of the
environment, (6) marine scientific research, and (7)
the settlement of disputes.
The policy of the United States as the time of
the Third Law of the Sea Conference approached was set
forth on March 14, 1974. John N. Moore, who had
replaced John Stevenson as Chairman of the Inter-agency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea (Stevenson was made
Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference), summa-
rized that policy before the House of Representative's
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Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and Inter-
national Law.
The United States' policy regarding the breadth
of the territorial sea and the transit of international
straits was stated as follows
:
In an attempt to develop world-wide consensus on
the breadth of the territorial sea, the United
States has proposed that, in the context of an
overall satisfactory settlement , it would be will-
ing to accept a 12-mile territorial sea.2
However
,
Because of the importance of straits as avenues for
international navigation the United States has
coupled its willingness to agree to a 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea with recognition of a treaty right of
unimpeded transit through and over straits used for
international navigation.
3
This became the declared position of the United States
at the Caracas Conference on July 11, 1974.
Moore statement of 14 March 1974, p. 4.
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
4
The policy for the living resources was to be
"broad coastal state control over coastal and anadro-
mous stocks coextensive with the range of each species
and international management of highly migratory
species .
"
Three main points characterized the policy for
the non-living resources of the sea (petroleum and
minerals interests). First, in order to encourage
development of resources, a timely (by that meaning
1974-1975) international regime was to be established.
Second, the regime would provide revenue sharing with
the international community, particularly the develop-
ing countries. Third, any international machinery that
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Certain suppositions can be drawn from Moore's
statement regarding the U.S. national policy. The
12-mile limit seemed to stand the best chance for
international agreement. Without agreement as to the
territorial sea limit all other issues would be moot
and the international community would be back to where
it was in 1960. The U.S. would accept a 12-mile limit
"in the context of an overall satisfactory settlement."
In other words, if its other interests were protected.
was to be established would be non-discretionary in
providing access to the resources.
Policy for the protection of the marine environ-
ment was based upon a functional separation. Hazards
to the environment with respect to pollution from
exploration and exploitation of the seabed would be
protected against by the coastal state following mini-
mum standards set by the international community (again
protection of the petroleum interests). However,
hazards caused by shipping were to be protected against
through IflCO.
The U.S. proposal for marine research was a
two-fold one. First, any state desiring to do research
within the areas where another country had coastal
state jurisdiction over the resources of that area
would be required to provide reasonable advanced noti-
fication of the intent. Second, the coastal state
within whose resource jurisdiction the research is con-
ducted would be allowed to participate or be represented
during the research and be assisted in the interpreta-
tion of the data.
The last point concerned the settlement of dis-
putes. This was a very important element of policy for
the petroleum and minerals industries, for without it
they feared the continuation of the same expropriation
policies at sea that they had recently faced ashore.
The U.S. proposal contained compulsory settlement of
disputes by an oceans tribunal.
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But even if this requirement was met, a 12-mile limit
would only be acceptable if it provided for "unimpeded"
vice "innocent" transit of international straits.
Thus, transit of international straits played the ke - '
role in U.S. policy.
Statements by government officials support this
interpretation of the primacy for unimpeded passage in
our national policy. Senator Pell, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Ocean and
International Environment stated at the Caracas Con-
ference that:
We need freedom of passage for our ships, sub-
marines--submerged--and aircraft and unless this
is guaranteed, I don't believe the United States
would ratify a convention.
We will give away a great deal. ... We will
give up a portion of our national wealth, but not
of our national security.
^
This is especially interesting in that Senator Pell,
being from Rhode Island, has in general supported the
extension of U.S. fishing jurisdiction out to 200
miles
.
Our Ambassador to the Caracas Conference,
John Stevenson, also supports the supposition of the
importance of unimpeded passage
:
ln Senator Pell Spurns New Sea Law," San Diego
Union, 6 August 1974, p. A-6.
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The No. 1 priority is the mobility of our naval and
air forces and the importance of retaining our
nuclear deterrence
.
Referring to the international straits he stated:
It is important to have a regime of unimpeded
transit through these straits .
2
Finally, in his address to the joint session of
Congress upon becoming President of the United States,
Mr. Ford stated:
. . . we cannot rely on the forbearance of others
to protect this nation. The power and diversity of
the armed forces , the resolve of our fellow citi-
zens, the flexibility in our command to navigate
international waters that remain troubled--all are
essential to our security.
3
President Ford may have been speaking in metaphorical
terms but the relationship in his mind between "inter-
national waters" and "security" is significant.
In summary, U.S. national policy for the law of
the sea is based upon international acceptance of the
doctrine of umimpeded passage through and over inter-
national straits. Such passage is viewed by the
leaders of the nation as vital to the national security
of the United States.
"Envoy Relates U.S. Sea Law Objective," San
Diego Union, 8 August 1974, p. A-10.
2
Ibid.
"Text of President Ford's Congress Speech,"





The policy of the United States for the Third
Law of the Sea Conference has been attacked both within
the United States and from abroad. Nationally these
attacks are usually from industries that are not satis-
fied that their specific interests are being protected
by the government from foreign encroachment. In some
cases, such as the fisheries industries, it is a fear
that one segment of the industry will benefit more from
the policy than another.
The key question to be solved by the inter-
national community is the limit of national sovereignty
at sea. The policy of the United States is to accept
a 12-mile limit based upon unimpeded or free transit
through international straits. It has been a basic
policy of the United States since 1970.
This element of national policy has been criti-
cized in a staff report prepared for the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which stated
the following in regard to free transit through the
international straits:
Free transit and unimpeded passage mean the
same. The latter term was adopted by the State Depart-
ment in the early part of 1974 because it was felt to
be less offensive to coastal states. (Lynch interview.)
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All transiting vessels and aircraft, including
military vessels and aircraft, would be free from
any action by the coastal nation to prevent transits
which it considers to be not innocent. In essence,
military vessels and aircraft transiting inter-
national straits would be enjoying freedom from law
or legal regulations--a status not enjoyed by any
navigator since the days of the pirates. . . .
Further
:
. . . we believe that the U.S. free transit pro-
posal may be unattainable and ... we fear that the
Department of Defense might urge the administration
to abandon its deep sea mining objectives and sup-
port the creation of an international seabed mining
monopoly controlled by less developed nations as a
trade-off for votes of such less developed nations
in favor of the Defense Department-sponsored free
transit proposal.
To sacrifice U.S. mineral interests in mining
the deep seabed for a perceived military objective
is at least debatable; but to sacrifice U.S.
mineral objectives in mining the deep seabed for





In addition to this stricture, some publicists
in foreign affairs have decried it. The objections put
forward are that, (1) the position represents a protec-
tion of Department of Defense interests cloaked in a
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, The Law of the Sea Crisis: A Staff
Report on the United Nations Seabed Committee , the
Outer Continental Shelf, and Marine Mineral Development ,
92nd Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, 2 pts., 1971-
1972, pt. 1, pp. 9-10.
2 Ibid.
3
Brown and Fabian, p. 307.
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veil of national security, (2) that making the position
"non-negotiable" may force a trade-off on other more
important interests, and (3) insistence on unimpeded
transit through international straits may cause a
failure to attain any international agreement.
More specific objections were made in a state-
ment by H. Gary Knight, Professor of Marine Resources
Law, Louisiana State University, before the House of
Representatives ' Subcommittee on International Organi-
zations and Movements. He made assumptions concerning
U.S. naval strategy, then pointed out the weaknesses in
such a strategy.
Professor Knight saw the interests of the
Department of Defense as
:
. . . (1) naval mobility, which can be subdivided
between the needs of the nuclear armed Polaris
fleet and more traditional naval operations, and
(2) the right to implant anti-submarine warfare
("ASW") tracking and detection devices on the
seabed . •*
He then made the assumption that
:
. . . both non-detection and non-destruction of
nuclear armed Polaris class submarines are the key
elements in the preservation of our second strike
nuclear capability which is, in turn, the linchpin
of the current deterrent to nuclear conflict. I am
also assuming that detection is a sine qua non to
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Law of the Sea, p. 73.
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destruction. Finally, I assume that our strategy
is based essentially on confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
Proceeding from that point, Professor Knight
argued that it is unnecessary to guarantee submerged
transit for nuclear submarines through international
straits. First, if the Soviet Union did possess ASW
detection devices in international straits, then sub-
merged transit would not prevent detection. If they
did not possess them, then they would have them in
place before any unimpeded transit could be inter-
nationally guaranteed. Secondly, the advent of the
Underwater Launching Missile System (ULMS), with its
increased range, would make passage through inter-
national straits unnecessary. Third, detection of a
submarine does not necessariy mean that a second strike
capability will be impaired. Finally, the USSR sup-
ports unimpeded passage through international straits
.




Internationally, the position of the United
States regarding unimpeded passage through international
straits is opposed by some developing countries as well
1 Ibid.
,







as a few established nations who have been formerly
close friends of American policy. These countries
could be further divided into two groups, the Archi-
pelago States and the Strait States. Among the former,
one finds such countries as Indonesia, Phillipines
,
and Greece. Among the latter are Spain, Morocco,
Malaysia, Yemen, and Cyprus.
Although the two groups differ conceptually,
in practice they are united in objecting to foreign
ships transiting their waters without expressed permis-
sion. The Strait States base their argument on terri-
torial sea claims while the Archipelago States argue
2that their waters are internal. The Strait and Archi-
pelago States submitted joint draft articles on naviga-
tion through the territorial seas including straits
According to Capt . Lynch, Spain has been the
most outspoken critic. (Lynch interview.)
2
The archipelago concept was introduced by
Indonesia in December of 1957. Indonesi.a argued that
its 13,000 islands presented such a complex problem in
determining its territorial seas that , instead of
establishing a baseline around each island, the base-
line would be established around the archipelago as a
whole and that all waters within were internal and
subject to national jurisdiction. This resulted in a
parrallelogram 3,000 miles in length which expanded the
sovereign claim of Indonesia from roughly 700,000 square
miles to cover 3,500,000 square miles. The area of
Indonesia was increased from approximately the size of
the States of Alaska and Arizona to greater than the
entire land area of the U.S.
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used for international navigation to the United Nations
Sea-Bed Committee in March of 1973. This draft repre-
sented the opposing views to the United States policy
on territorial seas and unimpeded passage through
international straits by foreign critics. There were
five major characteristics to their proposals: (1)
unitarian treatment, (2) balance of interests through
the concept of "innocent passage," (3) regulation of
passage, (4) special treatment for ships with special
characteristics, and (5) control of foreign warships.
The policy of the Strait and Archipelago States
is based upon unitarian treatment. Whereas the United
States believes that international straits , because of
the function they serve in international navigation,
deserve special treatment, these States believe they do
not. If the strait falls within the territorial waters
or internal waters of a state , the rules applicable to
these waters apply. Emphasis is placed on the guaran-
teed right of innocent passage protecting foreign
commerce
.
United Nations Document A/AC. 138/SC . II/L. 18
of 27 March 1973 in U.N. General Assembly, 28th sess.,
Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, Supplement No. 21 (A/9021), vol. 5.
9
de Ytumaga, p. 87.
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The opposing states believe that innocent pas-
sage achieves a balance between the interests of the
coastal state and the interests of international mari-
time navigation. They argue that:
The notion of "free transit" through straits
which form part of the territorial sea is unknown
to state practice and cannot offer an adequate
solution to the problem, because it would alter the
existing balance of interests between coastal and
noncoastal states, and derogate the sovereignty of
the former over the territorial seas . Such an
aftermath can hardly be admitted within an organi-
zation which is based on the principle of sovereign
equality of all its members (art. 2, para. 1 of the
U.N. Charter). 1
Innocent passage is believed to be the best way that
the coastal state can exercise sovereign rights over
its territory and provide for its national security.
The draft would expand the right of coastal
states to assure that ships exercising the right of
innocent passage comply with laws and regulations
enacted by the coastal state. Specifically, it would
expand the scope of these rights to include the estab-
lishment of sea lanes, the prevention of pollution, and
the regulation of scientific research.
In addition to the above regulation of passage,
the coastal state would have the right to regulate the




ships fall into three categories: type of propulsion,
nature of cargo, and activity of ship. These vessels
require special rules whereby the coastal state may
protect its security.
The 19 5 8 Conference on the Law of the Sea was
not specific enough in regulating the passage of war-
ships through territorial waters and international
straits. The Strait and Archipelago States' draft
would require that such passage be conditional upon
prior notification to or authorization by the coastal
state
.
Expressed in terms of ocean theory, the United
States' policy for the use of the oceans of the world
is a combination of functional nationalism and func-
tional internationalism. The proposal submitted by
the Strait and Archipelago States , with its stress on
a nation's sovereign rights, is best described as
normative nationalism.
There are four theoretical schools for the
allocation of ocean resources. Normative Nationalists
believe the resources of the ocean are their sovereign
right. Functional Nationalists claim that the nation-
state is the most useful institution for making deci-
sions regarding the use of the oceans through special
purpose zones. Functional Internationalists see some
issues beyond the capacity of the nation-state to solve
alone and that international cooperation in specific




The United States recognizes that in order for
a meaningful regime to emerge from the international
community for the exploitation of ocean resources,
needed for the rising world population, an agreement
must be reached regarding the extent of a nation's
sovereignty over the sea. To this end a national
policy has been formed which would abandon a tradi-
tional stance of recognizing only a 3-mile limit to
territorial seas for one that would incorporate a
12-mile limit. This would be conditional upon the
recognized right of unimpeded passage instead of inno-
cent passage through international straits. These
straits have historically acted as a catalyst for con-
flict between nations. Such a position is typical of
the functional approach which the United States prefers
in law of the sea matters for only in this manner can
it hope to satisfy all its various domestic interests.
This policy has raised some political issues
within the United States. Domestically the policy has
been attacked as favoring Department of Defense
a new world order to replace the nation-state. R. L.
Friedheim, Understanding the Debate on Ocean Resources




interests over other interests. It is felt that
national security does not require unimpeded passage
through international straits, particularly for war-
ships and planes. Furthermore, by maintaining a strong
stance on this issue, more important interests would be
negotiated away. This is particularly true of deep
seabed mining, and, by inference, petroleum resources.
In examining the process used for reaching the
U.S. policy for the Third Law of the Sea Conference,
it must be concluded that all political interests had
an opportunity for being represented. If anything,
petroleum interests could even have been favored. One
of the key figures in the formation of national policy,
John Stevenson, was formerly with the law firm of
Sullivan and Cromwell, who represent Standard Oil of
New Jersey. In spite of this, there seems to have
been equal treatment afforded to all interests by the
civilian leadership.
According to Capt . Lynch (Lynch interview),
Stevenson was frequently attacked by oil representa-
tives during the policy meetings for not supporting his
own interests (oil). Additionally, it should be noted
that the then Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, had
married into the Mellon family who has extensive hold-
ings in Gulf Oil. Warner was deeply involved in the
formation of policy for the law of the sea on the




On the international level, U.S. policy for
unimpeded passage has been opposed by a group of states
which are either archipelago countries or which have
coastlines on international straits. Their argument is
given in legal terms, stating that free transit "is
unknown to state practice." In reality their argument
is a political one. They fear that unimpeded passage
may change the "balance of interests" between coastal
and maritime states, thus affecting the national




All was ruled by that harsh and despotic factor,
shipping.
1
Domestic critics argue that the right of
unimpeded passage through international straits is not
necessary for the national security of the United
States
.
They have given what appears to be reasonable
objections to the adopted policy. It remains to inves-
tigate in more detail how the national security of the
U.S. is involved in this issue. In so doing, it may be
possible to sustain or reject criticism of the policy.
All the objections to unimpeded passage raised
within the United States have one feature in common.
They separate military considerations from non-
military. By so doing, they are able to attack what
might be the weaker of the two positions. It is
somewhat easier to provide quantitative data to show
shipping's role in the U.S. economy, than to quantify
an abstract such as nuclear deterrence. Any discussion
Winston L. Churchill, The Grand Alliance
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), cited by Robert D.
Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotation:
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966), p. 294.
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of the importance of unimpeded passage through inter-
national straits for the U.S. must address both mili-
tary and non-military considerations in order to be
complete. Any maritime strategy developed for the
nation's security is a combination of the two. "...
naval strategy is not a thing by itself. . . . its
problems can seldom or never be solved on naval con-
siderations alone. . . ."
Military Considerations
If one took the statements of political leaders
and government officials of the United States at face
value it would appear that, in their view, the national
security of the U.S. is best achieved through "peace"
2based on milxtary strength. If military strength
Julian S. Corbett
,
Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972),
p. 9.
2
How much reliance can be placed upon the
public statements of political actors is not agreed
upon by social scientists. The degree of reliance is
often associated with the methodology employed. A
behavioralist would place a great deal less emphasis in
what political actors say and more emphasis on their
actions. Another position is that advanced by Harre
and Secord . They believe that we must listen to what
is being said. "Traditional arguments against taking
self reports seriously overlook the fact that at least
some statements are not a sign of a state of mind, but
themselves constitute that state of mind (e.g., to com-
plain is to be discontented). It is through reports of
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plays a central role in U.S. national security, how is
this strength weakened by a rejection of unimpeded pas-
sage through international straits? In order to answer
this, one must inquire what present military thought
is—especially maritime strategy..
U.S. military strategy as seen by the Depart-
ment of Defense was outlined by former Secretary of
Defense, Elliot Richardson, who as we have seen had a
key part in the formation of ocean policy for the U.S.
In a statement before the House Armed Services
feelings, plans, intentions, beliefs, reasons, and so
on that the meanings of social behaviour and the rules
underlying social acts can be discovered." H. Harre
and P. F. Secord , The Explanation of Social Behaviour
(Totowa, N.H. : Littlefield, Adems S Co., 1973), p. 7.
If this hypothesis is correct , then we might be
misjudging the importance of statements by political
leaders in dismissing them entirely. To apply this to
the case in point, we have the following statements by
government officials. Former President Nixon: "When
we speak of priorities , the first priority must always
be peace for America and the world." President Ford
speaking before Congress: "Successful foreign policy
is an extension of the hopes of the whole American
people for a world of peace and orderly freedom. . . .
A strong defense is the surest way to peace. Strength
makes detente attainable. Weakness invites War. . . ."
Finally, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs: "In a world as it is--and is
likely to be for the indefinite future—military
strength and diplomacy are the fingers of the same
hand. A national commitment to the search for peace,
not backed up by military strength, would not be a
policy at all. It would be a pious expression of hope,
devoid either of credibility or effect."
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Committee on April 10, 1973, Richardson declared that
the first military objective in support of our security
interests was: "Together with our allies, deter war-
fare at all levels of conflict and maintain the capa-
bility to defend our interests should deterrence fail."
This strategy was further refined at the
Department of the Navy level. Admiral Turner, former
President of the Naval War College, has given the most
recent insight into present naval strategic thought in
support of Defense Department policy. In order to
support the national security objectives, the navy
considers that it has four missions, (1) strategic
deterrence, (2) sea control, (3) projection of power
2
ashore, and (4) naval presence. These missions have
U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Commit-
tee, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 74 , by Elliot
Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 26.
2 Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the Navy,"
Naval War College Review 26 (March-April 1974): 2-18.
According to Turner, "strategic deterrence" can be
subdivided into (1) having an assured second strike
capability, (2) being able to control a response in
case of a partial nuclear attack, (3) being able to
deter third powers from attack, and (4) presentation of
a "balance of power image" to other countries.
"Sea control" is a deliberate alteration of the
traditional naval mission of "control of the seas."
Turner believes that it is no longer conceivable for
any one power to dominate the ocean. Control can only
be exercised on, over, or under the ocean in limited
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one thing in common, the need for maximum mobility
under, on, and above the sea. Professor Knight appears
to have correctly identified the nucleus of Defense
Department interests in the law of the sea policy for
the U.S. He had divided these interests between the
"nuclear armed Polaris fleet" (strategic deterrence
mission) and "more traditional naval operations" (sea
control, projection of power ashore, and naval pres-
ence). However, he directed his argument against only
one of the four missions, that of strategic deterrence.
Professor Knight indicated that it is unneces-
sary to have submerged transit of international straits
because it would not avoid detection of our nuclear
submarines . This appears to be placing unwarranted
faith in both the U.S. and the Soviet anti-submarine
(ASW) capabilities. It is a general opinion in naval
circles that, in spite of the efforts expended in other
areas for limited times.
While "sea control" concerns itself with what
happens militarily in the ocean medium, "projection of
power ashore" is concerned with the impact of naval
forces on land forces. This impact can be in the form
of amphibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical
air strikes.
"Naval presence" is the use of naval forces,
short of war, to achieve political objectives. These
could be broadly stated as deterring or encouraging




areas, the best way to hunt a submerged submarine is by
use of another submarine.
Equally important as the right to place seabed
sensors in the straits, as suggested by Knight, is the
right to proceed without prior notification or authori-
zation through an international strait. If notification
of transit was required under international law, it
could affect nuclear deterrence. First, it could
involve the strait state in the present great power
nuclear stalemate , thus expanding the scope and com-
plexity of the deterrent problem. Second, and related
to the first, the strait state could be put under pres-
sure by the nuclear powers to pass transit information
to them, easing the problem of interception by attack
submarines. This in turn could enhance a first strike
capability. Third, and most important, the ability to
affect deterrence would give the strait state political
power warranted by only its geographic position.
Two elements overlooked in the need for sub-
merged transit are the simple ones of cost and safety.
Even the United States could ill afford to lose a $781
Sherman E. Wright, Jr., "ASW and the Modern




million submarine. This sum is greater than the gross
national product (GNP) of 36 non-communist countries,
among them the Strait States of Yeman and Cyprus.
A nuclear submarine has been designed as a true
submersible. For this reason it operates most effi-
ciently and safely m the submerged condition. When
on the surface it handles poorly, especially in rough
weather. Additionally, its low profile and dark color
make it extremely difficult to see and to judge its
maneuvers. The submarine's conning officer is likewise
hampered. His ability to see surface ships may be
3limited because of his low height of eye. The chances
for collision in the busy international straits is thus
increased by requiring these submarines to transit on
the surface instead of submerged.
It has been argued that unimpeded passage
through international straits will not be required with
the introduction of the Underwater Launching Missile
U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Commit-
tee, Annual Defense Department Report , p. 57.
2
R. S. Crenshaw, Jr., Naval Shiphandling
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1963), pp. 247-
248.
The distance to the horizon is approximately
5.7 n.m. for a Polaris boat as compared to 8.9 n.m. for
the new fleet oilers.
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System (ULMS). The ULMS would have over a 4,000 mile
range making transit of international straits unneces-
sary in order to provide nuclear deterrence. Theoreti-
cally, this would almost be a valid argument with the
2,880 mile Polaris missile. By stationing Polaris
submarines around the Asian land mass, but outside of
international straits, it would be possible to reach
every area of the USSR with the exception of the
Sayanski mountain region of southern Siberia. But
drawing arcs on a map belies reality, it does not take
into account ice caps, depth of water, location of
vital industries, or the location of population.
Deterrence, like beauty, is in the eye of the
beholder. The U.S. deterrence is based on the capabil-
ity of "assured destruction" by a second strike.
Former Secretary of Defense McNamara has defined this
as the capability of inflicting upon the USSR the
destruction of 50 percent of its industry and 20-25
2percent of its population. In order to inflict the
necessary population casualties the Soviets would have
The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 (London: Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 69
Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security (New
York: Harper 8 Rowe , 1968), p. 76.
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to destroy 48 American cities while the United States
would be faced with the task of hitting 88 of theirs.
Thus America faces a more complex targeting problem.
Aside from the targeting problem, the United
States is presently inferior to the Soviet Union in
numbers of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
available. The SLBM submarine is the least vulnerable
of the U.S. missile forces and comprises 44 nuclear
submarines carrying 710 missiles. Under standard
operating conditions half of the U.S. Navy's SLBMs are
in a ready posture. This would equate to 355 missiles
available to strike 88 cities, roughly a 4 to 1 ratio.
The Soviet Union has the capability of launch-
2
ing 950 missiles by its 62 strategic submarines.
Using the same approach as we did with the U.S. forces,
the Soviets would be able to launch 475 missiles at
the required 48 U.S. cities. They would have about a
10 to 1 ratio.
ULMS in combination with the Multiple
Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) would
help the United States off-set this superiority. The
"Zumwalt Says Russia Gaining on U.S. Fleet,"





same number of submarines with the increased range that
ULMS affords would give the U.S. a more flexible
coverage along with greater density of coverage.
Cities originally targeted for Inter-continental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) could be retargeted to the
more assured threat of the SLBM. These advantages
might be canceled if the increased range advantage were
to be used up by keeping forces outside the inter-
national straits.
Another important advantage accrues by utiliz-
ing the entire expanse of ocean offered by the intro-
duction of ULMS. The ASW capability of the attack
submarine has already been mentioned. A good portion
of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine's concern in
the future will be to rid itself of these unwelcomed
escorts. The more ocean available for maneuvering and
hiding, while still remaining within range of its
designated targets, the greater the opportunity to
retain a viable deterrent.
While much has been said regarding the nuclear
deterrent mission of the navy by Professor Knight, he
says little about the need for naval mobility in the
more traditional forms of naval operations. It is
believed that these traditional missions of the navy

48
are becoming more rather than less important. In April
of this year Defense Secretary Schlesinger told two
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittees on Security and
Arms Control that he believes conventional forces are
now more than ever required because of nuclear parity.
Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt , has
been even more definite in his views:
Both navies, U.S. and U.S.S.R., are designed in
part for nuclear deterrence . To that extent , our
tasks are similar. Beyond that point, however, U.S.
Naval forces are designed to support disLant U.S.
forces overseas , and under the Nixon Doctrine , when
required, the indigenous armies of our allies,
necessitating forward defense, sea control, and
the ability to project our power ashore. ... We
have, in addition, a logistic defense requirement
of vast proportions.
It is in the traditional naval operations that
the need for unimpeded passage through straits becomes
more obvious. It may well be argued that a 4,000 mile
missile may hit moscow from the mid-Atlantic, thus
providing deterrence . But a naval task force which is
'-"Non-Nuclear Arms Stressed," San Diego Union,
5 April 1974, p. A-8 . The question should be raised:
if parity has been achieved, why the need for ULMS?
The point here is that with or without parity, the need
for unimpeded passage remains. With ULMS it is needed
to bring more targets within range of the SLBM while
allowing evasion. If ULMS is not needed because of
parity, then traditional missions require the passage.
o
Cited by John Collins, Grand Strategy
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972), p. 69.

49
denied passage through the Straits of Hormuz , would be
of little use as a support to some Persian Gulf country
which would continue close ties with the United States.
As U. Alexis Johnson has pointed out, "... military
strength and diplomacy are fingers of the same hand."
Another example can be offered to show the
importance of unimpeded passage for the traditional
naval missions of sea control, projection of power
ashore, and naval presence. During the Indo-Pakistan
War of December, 1971 the United States sent Task Force
74 comprising of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVAN 65), the
helicopter carrier Tripoli (LPH 10) with 800 marines
aboard, and seven destroyer class ships on a naval
presence mission. The ships utilized the Straits of
Malacca in reaching their destination. If they had
been denied passage through the Straits and the archi-
pelago concept was in force, two states (Malaysia and
Indonesia) could have aborted the mission by acting
in concert. The distance from Subic Bay in the Philip-
pines to India is roughly 3,000 miles via the Straits
of Malacca. Ships denied passage through the Strait
and the waters surrounding the Indonesian islands would
have to circumnavigate the eastern side of New Guinea.
See p. 39 (n. 2)
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This would increase the transit to 8,000 miles requiring
21 days instead of 9 days to complete. Nor would it
have been possible to send ships from the 6th Fleet in
the Mediterranean of the East Coast of the U.S. to
arrive any earlier. The war itself lasted only 14 days.
The report to the Jackson Committee opposed
unimpeded passage on the basis that granting such right
to military craft would allow them to enjoy "freedom
from law of legal regulations— a status not enjoyed
. . . since the days of the pirates. ..." This is
an overstatement of the facts as will be pointed out in
more detail in the following chapter. What is important
at this time is the related opinion that, the adoption
of a policy which supports unimpeded passage for war-
ships by the U.S. would lead to failure for inter-
national agreement. Professor Knight noted that the
USSR supports unimpeded passage. A reading of the
2draft articles submitted by the United States and the
1See p. 28.
2United Nations, General Assembly, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Subcommittee
II, 28th sess., Draft Articles on the Breadth of the
Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted by
the United States (A/AC 138/SC II/L.4), 30 July 1971.
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Soviet Union for the Caracas Conference reveals that
the wording of the two documents are so similar as to
indicate close cooperation by the two countries in their
formation. From this it would appear that the agreement
by the two superpowers regarding unimpeded passage of
all ships
,
including warships , would enhance rather than
negate the possibility for world-wide agreement.
Agreement for unimpeded passage through inter-
national straits for warships is not a simple matter of
developing countries opposing developed countries. The
"Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concern-
ing Problems of the Sea" resulted in the issuance of
the "Santo Domingo Declaration" of June, 1972 which ten
2developing nations were signatories. The document
offered a compromise solution for the many problems
associated with the law of the sea--primarily through
the concept of a "patrimonial sea." Nothing in this
concept would prevent maritime nations from exercising
United Nations, General Assembly, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Subcomittee
II, 28th sess., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Draft Articles on Straits Used for International Navi-
gation (A/AC 138/SC II/1.7), 25 July 1972.
These were Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
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"free passage" as compared to "innocent passage"
through international straits. Nor is it likely that
some developing countries such as Iran would like to
see Strait of Hormuz come under the control of a
hostile country, as witnessed by its claims to two
strategically located strait islands (Abu Musa and the
Thums) in 19 71.
The actual fear of the Jackson Report appears
to be that mineral interests will be subordinated to
military considerations. How important are these non-
military considerations?
Non-Military Considerations
Three percent of the world's Gross National
Product (GNP) is derived from ocean activities. This
equates to approximately $62.5 billion. Of this
amount, living resources contributed $8 billion while
non-living resources account for $6 billion. Shipping
Charles L. Cochran, "An Inter-American
Approach to the Law of the Sea?", Naval War College
Review 26 (March-April 1974): 64.
".
. . to sacrifice U.S. mineral objectives in
mining the deep seabed for what may be an unattainable
military objective is folly, . . ." (see p. 28).
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has been estimated to add $40-50 billion to the world
GNP. 1
The share of the total $62.5 billion GNP that
the United States contributes is estimated at between
$15-25 billion. If we take the average, the United
States accounts for one-third of the world's GNP
associated with ocean activities.
A breakdown of the United States ' GNP contrib-
uted by shipping, living, and non-living resources is
not available. It has, however, been estimated that
the United States owns or controls, through individuals
or corporations, one-third of the world's shipping.
Taking the low figure of $40 billion as shipping's
contribution to world GNP, the share of U.S. shipping
could be estimated to be $13.3 billion. Even if the
United States contributed the entire amount of the $8
billion and $6 billion for living and non-living
resources, shipping would still play the dominant role
in the economics involved. In terms of percentage of
United States GNP generated by shipping (civil plus
military) rough estimates could be made placing it from
1 2Hodgson and Mclntyre, pp. 1-2. Ibid.
o
Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant
Shipping Policies and Politics (Washington , D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 105.
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2 to 6 percent of total GNP. While this is small, it
still is better than the combined percentage of a
little over 1 percent for living and non-living
resources
.
Shipping is likely to remain the leading ocean
industry for the United States in the foreseeable
future. It has already been pointed out that, even
with offshore oil, the U.S. will be dependent upon
shipping to carry half of its petroleum requirements
o
by 1985. Offshore mining of minerals could reduce the
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1972, p. 314 inter alia. The method of using GNP as a
social indicator is not completely satisfying. Heil-
broner has described four problems associated with it:
(1) GNP deals in dollar values, not in physical units,
(2) GNP does not reflect the quality of output, (3)
GNP does not reflect the purpose of production, and (4)
GNP does not include most goods and services that are
not for sale. (Robert Heilbroner, The Economic Problem
[Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972], pp. 181-
183.)
While non-living resources might contribute a
maximum of only $6 billion in terms of immediate GNP,
its contribution as perhaps an energy source necessary
for further production and further generation of _ GNP is
overlooked. On the other hand, something with little
utility, such as a pleasure boat, would be given the
same importance as a more utilitarian product and be
reflected as shipbuilding. Perhaps all that can be
said is that it gives us a poor but universally recog-
nized indicator of the relative importance of the ocean
activities
.
2 See p. 18.
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imports of such metals as nickel, manganese, colbalt
,
and copper. The mining, however, must still take place
in the deep sea regions of the ocean. This means that
the minerals would require ships to carry them to the
United States.
The U.S. is also dependent upon ships for the
import of living resources of the sea and, without a
major change in fishing techniques, is likely to remain
so. The United States must import $844 million worth
of industrial fish each year. This represents half
2U.S. requxrements
.
Shipping has a certain strategic value to the
United States. This is most obvious in the case of
petroleum supplies but not limited to them. The United
States exports two-thirds of the world's coal and one-
3half of its grain. According to Department of the
Jack N. Barkenbus , "International Implications
of Manganese Nodule Mining," paper prepared for the
Western Peace Science Association Meetings, San Diego,
Ca., 21-22 February 1974, p. 309. Barkenbus estimates
the reduction of imports at 53 percent for nickel, 12
percent for manganese, and 41 for copper. Colbolt
imports would be eliminated.
2John A. Knauss, "Factors Influencing a U.S.
Position in a Future Law of the Sea Conference," Occa-
sional Paper No. 10 for the Law of the Sea Insti" ite
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I., 1971, p. 8.
3 Baldwin, p. 289.
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Interior, the U.S. imports more than 5 percent of the
7 of the 13 raw materials considered essential to
industrial health. The Defense Department puts the
needs much higher. According to the Pentagon, 69 of
the 71 materials considered necessary for defense must
be shipped into the United States.
Shipping will continue to wax in both size and
importance as increased pressures are placed upon the
resources of the sea. The world fleet has already
grown from 100 million Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT)
in 1959 to 230 million GRT in 1971. 2 This year it is
in excess of 250 million GRT. This represents an
annual growth rate of 6 to 8 percent.
U.S. shipping requirements for an international
regime for the sea coincide and support military
requirements. Shipping's advantage over other forms of
transportation is its ability to carry great bulk at
economical rates. It is most economical when a direct
route can be utilized. The shortest shipping routes
1 Dean C. Miller, "Raw Material Cartels Feared,"
San Diego Union, 26 February 1974, p. A-9 . Also see
U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, U.S. Life Lines (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1966).
U.S., Department of the Interior, Minerals
Yearbook, 1971, p. 13.
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for world commerce use international straits. Any
closure or delay through these routes can be expensive.
It is because of the traditional importance of shipping,
and its need for economical short route travel, that
unimpeded passage is the primary element for U.S.
policy for the non-military as well as military con-
siderations. In time of peace and war, Strait and
Archipelago States would be given a major political
weapon if they could impede or stop shipping of a
particular country upon their own subjective judgment.
An example will be helpful to illustrate the
importance of unimpeded passage through international
straits for U.S. shipping costs. The distance from
Kuwait to New York by ship via the Strait of Gibraltar
is 8,483 nautical miles (n.m.) as compared to 11,962
n.m. around Capetown, a difference of 3,479 n.m. A
tanker sailing at its normal speed of 16 knots would
require almost 10 additional days to sail the Capetown
route. It costs an estimated $14,000 a day to run a
tanker. The additional sailing time for one tanker
would cost $140,000. On any one day 58 tankers enter
and leave the Persian Gulf. If one-third of these are




shipping through the denial of passage through this one
strait could amount to nearly $3 million per day or
over $1 billion in the course of a year. It could
increase the cost of a $12 barrel of oil to $18. The
implications of such a rise in energy costs have been
amply demonstrated within the last year.
Summary
Public statements by political leaders in the
U.S. place emphasis on "peace" through "strength" for
national security. Denial of the right to unimpeded
passage "could," though not conclusively would, be
detrimental for the mobility of naval forces and in
this way weaken national security. In practical terms,
surfaced vice submerged transit of nuclear submarines
presents a danger to their safety. Also, unimpeded
•passage through straits increases the complexity of
the ASW problem. In political terms, it seems unrea-
sonable to involve additional states in the already
complicated nuclear stalemate or to grant them the
advantage of being able to control both military and
commercial shipping. In economic terms, shipping does,
and probably will in the future, play the major role in
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ocean uses within the United States . Shipping requires
the same unimpeded passage as military vessels.
In summation, domestic defense and shipping
interests are best served by their present ability to
move through the oceans--which is the status quo.
Although they are now opposed by certain new domestic
interests for the utilization of the sea, such opposi-
tion is likely to diminish as the need for shipborne
imports and exports increases. In the long run, it
would seem that unimpeded passage deserves the emphasis
it has been given in domestic policy.
Failure to reach international political agree-
ment for a law of the sea could increase tensions and
thus weaken security. But would adherence to unimpeded
passage cause such a failure? Although the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. are in agreement as to its importance and not
all developing countries oppose it, it cannot be said
with certainty that success or failure would be inevit-





Governments . . . are always anxious to shake off
the restraining influence that international law
might have upon their foreign policies, to use
international law instead for the promotion of
their national interests, and to evade legal obli-
gations that might be harmful to them. They have
used the imprecision of international law as a
ready made tool for furthering their ends.
In the previous chapter the problem of national
security and the international straits was dealt with
on the basis of how it is seen in the perspective of
U.S. national policy as reflected in the domestic
debate surrounding its position for the Third Law of
the Sea Conference. Strong, even if not conclusive,
domestic reasons exist for the United States to support
unimpeded passage through international straits. It
remains to inquire whether overriding reasons exist on
the international level that would recommend abandoning
this policy.
1Hans J. Morgenthau , Polities Among Nations
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 276-277.
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The position of foreign opponents to unimpeded
passage has been discussed in Chapter I. Of relevance
to their argument is the opinion that "the notion of
free transit through straits which form part of the
territorial sea is unknown to state practice. ..."
Granting of such passage would be a violation of a
state's sovereign rights over its territory and could
lead to a weakening of its national security.
One must look to international law for a test
of the validity of these arguments. In doing so, the
rights of warships to transit international straits
will be emphasized on the assumption that these ships
present the most obvious threat to the national
security of the coastal state.
International Law Prior to World War II
The early publicists of international law,
Grotius and Selden, were more concerned with the
general rights of freedom of transit than with the
straits themselves. Pufendorf, writing in the
1 See p. 32. 2 See p. 33.
Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (New
York: Arno Press, 1972), and John Selden, Of the




mid-seventeenth century, addressed the question of the
right of coastal states to collect tolls from ships
using the straits. While recognizing the right of all
ships to use the straits , he concluded that a very
moderate sum in tolls could justly be paid to the
strait state to defer the cost of keeping the strait
navigable. According to Pufendorf , a danger exists
that the strait state may abuse the right of such tolls
in which case the maritime states are equally justified
in military action against the state.
Vattel , writing in 1758, is the first to point
out that there can be a functional separation of
straits between those that serve as communication
between two seas and used as a means of communication
between many nations, and those that do not. Refusal
of such passage through the former would be acting
2
against the "Law of Nature."
Hautefeuille
,
publishing in the mid-nineteenth
century, disagreed with Pufendorf regarding the right
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium
Libri Octo
,
trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 360-361.
2
E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the
Principles of Natural Law, trans. Charles G. Fenwick




to collect tolls, basing his objection on the argument
that the right of passage is not an easement (because
such a right did not exist in international law.)
Further, Hautefeuille believed that the strait state
did not have the right to search vessels in order to
determine whether passage is innocent unless through
special arrangements--"Le passage est libre sans aucune
exception." Hautefeuille not only recognized the
functional separation of the straits as adopted by
Vattel but further believed that the separation could
be even more detailed. The right of passage could be
entirely separated from the right of fishing and the
2
right of jurisdiction.
A British publicist, Holland, specifically
addressed the question of the passage of warships
through international straits. Noting that all pre-
vious (pre-1898) publicists on international law and
international straits were motivated by national and
personal considerations, he proceeded to put forward a
position that also favored his government. He made a
distinction between peacetime and wartime passage of









ships. In peacetime the passage of ships, including
warships, was innocent and therefore could not be
impeded. In wartime, each nation could deal with the
ships of the enemy as he desired.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
as Holland noted, each publicist writing on the inter-
national straits upheld a position that usually favored
his particular state. The liberal interpretations of
the law were offset by narrow interpretations. Bruel
notes that this situation changed during the early
part of the twentieth century and that the general
opinion of the publicists in the first thirty years of
this century was toward an even more liberal construc-
tion of the right of passage. This was accounted for
by the rise of internationalism.
. . . the litterature [sic] is inclined on the
whole, in the question of the extent of the terri-
torial waters, to follow the usual rules, while
with regard to the right of passage, it is disposed
in time of peace to allow both merchant vessels and
warships the right to pass through the territorial
waters in straits of the kind here classified as
international. In time of war, practically all
agree that merchant vessels belonging to states not
at war with the littoral state, have the right of
passage, and some authors even allow the right of
passage to warships belonging to belligerant
powers, so that i.o.w. the neutral littoral state
may not close international straits to the
latter. . . .
•Ibid., p. 60. 2 Ibid., p. 69.
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A resolution by the Institute of International
Law, published in 1916, sustains the contention that a
liberal interpretation of the law for straits passage
was the norm by the twentieth century. "Straits which
serve as passage from one open sea to another open sea
can never be closed."
Custom, as well as the writings of publicists,
seems to support the right of unimpeded transit of
international straits. In peacetime, this right
extends to warships as well as merchantmen. The one
exception, as will be noted, is that of the Turkish
Strait.
The earliest example of the custom of states
that is recorded concerns the Hellespont (Turkish
Straits). In 220 B.C. the Byzantines tried to levy
dues on Greek vessels sailing through the Straits. The
Greeks appealed to Rhodes, which was the leading mari-
time nation of the time. The Rhodeans declared war on
Byzantium and by their victory ended the extraction of
2
maritime dues thus allowing free passage.
James Brown Scott, ed . , Resolutions of the
Institute of International Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1916), p. 115.
Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and
Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London: Macmillan £
Co. , Ltd. , 1911), p. 380.
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A similar example is found in the Far East.
After the opening of Japan to foreign trade in the mid-
nineteenth century, Japan continued to prohibit the
transit of its straits, particularly the Shimonoseki
Strait, to foreign ships. In 1868, England, France,
the Netherlands, and the United States protested in a
joint note that this closing was contrary to inter-
national law. When Japan refused to voluntarily open
the Straits, the powers took joint action to force the
Straits open for both merchant ships and warships.
During the negotiations between Argentina and
Chile for a treaty covering the Straits of Magellan in
1881, the United States declared that it would not
tolerate excessive claims of any nation over these
Straits. Further, the British and the French tried to
get this principle confirmed by a collective treaty
covering the Straits. It was the French opinion that
if these Straits were closed to ships of war the prin-
2
ciple of freedom of navigation would be violated.
Up until 1913 the Danes viewed transit of the
Danish Straits by warships in the same restrictive way
Briiel
,
p. 105; see also Samuel Eliot Morison
,
"Old Bruin" Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (Boston:
Little, Brown £ Co., 1967), p. 442.
2 Bruel, p. 106.
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as the Turks, that is to say, transit of the Danish
Straits by warships was theoretically conditional upon
the King's consent. In practice some warships, partic-
ularly German warships, steamed the Straits at will.
On January 15, 1913 Denmark granted the right of
foreign warships to transit the Straits. Not even
notifications of such transits were required.
Positive law also indicates that the sovereign
rights of a state must be secondary to the welfare of
the international community.
Article 16, section 3 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations imposes on members the obligation not
only to allow but to facilitate the passage of any
armed force carrying out a punitive expedition. Such
passage could be through both the state's territory and
territorial waters. Thus, warships have the right to
pass through international straits, even when they are
formed by the territorial waters of a coastal state
,
when it is in the interest of world peace. Not only
should such passage be unimpeded but the coastal state
is obliged to assist in such passage!
Article 23e of the Covenant sustains national






good. On March 21, 1921 Germany had refused to allow
an English vessel, the Wimbledon, to pass through the
Kiel Canal. Germany was a neutral in the war between
Russia and Poland. The Wimbledon was carrying ammuni-
tion to the Polish Military Commission at Danzig.
Germany argued that allowing the ship to pass through
the Canal would violate its neutrality. The Allied and
Associated Powers (France, Italy, Japan, and Great
Britain) opposed this position on the basis of Article
23e of the Covenant. This Article had its origin in
the principle of unconditional freedom of navigation on
the high seas contained in President Wilson's Fourteen
Points. Article 23e called upon all members of the
League to
:
. . . make provisions to secure and maintain
freedom of communications and of transit and
equitable treatment for the commerce of all
Members of the League. . . .
1
The Wimbledon Case was decided in the Permanent
Court of International Justice on August 17, 1923. Its
decision was based on the fact that the Canal had been
declared neutralized by Article 380 of the Versailles
Peace Treaty. The decision declared that the Kiel
League Covenant, cited by Inis L. Claude, Jr.,




Canal shall be free and open to the warships and mer-
chant vessels of all nations at peace with Germany.
The Kiel Canal is not an international strait
because it is man-made. It may be argued with con-
siderable validity that the Court's ruling is not
applicable to the straits issue. But, here is a strip
of sovereign territory 335 feet wide, 37 feet deep, and
61 miles long, running through, and well within the
borders of a sovereign state. Despite this, unimpeded
passage has been granted under international law to a
munitions ship of foreign registry. The claim of a
sovereign right of neutrality was not enough to pre-
serve the control of the Canal for the Germans , even
though they constructed it within their own state.
International law reflected the political reality that
Germany was a defeated country.
As noted, the Turkish Straits had been a con-
stant exception to the general trend of recognition for
unimpeded passage for warships through international
straits. Even this situation changed with the signing
of the Lausanne Treaty on July 24, 1923 between the
Allies and Turkey. The Allies had suffered great
Edward Hambro , The Case Law of the Inter-






losses during World War I in trying to force open the
Turkish Straits. President Wilson, in Point Twelve of
his Fourteen Points, wanted internationalization of
these Straits. Article 23 of the Lausanne Treaty
stated that the contracting parties recognized and
declare the principle of freedom of passage and naviga-
tion, for both sea and air, in time of peace and war
through the Turkish Straits. In all previous treaties
pertaining to the Turkish Straits, Turkey had specifi-
cally denied unimpeded passage through the Straits for
warships at any time. Now this was made conspicuous by
its absence. It was also apparent that this freedom
of passage was complete, requiring no previous notifi-
cation of passage for either merchant ship or warship.
That the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty applied to
warships is supported by the fact that the Montreux
Convention on the Straits, signed on July 26, 1936,
later specifically rescended this right of passage for
warships and required notification plus other restric-
tions .
Briiel has made the observation that the right
of innocent passage of warships through Turkish Straits
1 Cleve Parry, ed., A British Digest of Inter-
national Law, 8 vols. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1967),
2b:24-25; see also Bruel, p. 172.
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was established in international law by the Lausanne
Treaty. When the international political situation had
deteriorated in 1936, Russia and Turkey felt that a new
treaty was required to replace the liberal Lausanne
one. This instituted the Montreux Convention which
reestablished the Ottoman Rule whereby warship passage
(including the submerged transit of submarines) was
again restricted.
The Hague Conference on the Codification of
International Law was held in 1930. Its Committee on
Territorial Waters, though unable to agree as to the
breadth of the territorial seas, did make a definite
statement regarding the right of unimpeded passage
through international straits.
Under no pretext whatever may the passage even
of warships through straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas be
interfered with.
The Conference was significant in another respect.
Andrassy points out that some publicists (Lapradelle
and Faushille) up until this time still considered even
the territorial sea as res communis , the Hague Confer-
ence was responsible for the beginning of the emphasis
1 Bruel, p. 98.
2 G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1973), p. 611.
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for "sovereignty" over this segment of water. Its
Draft Convention on the Territorial Sea stated:
"Sovereignty over this belt is exercised subject to the
conditions prescribed by the present Convention and
other rules of international law."
International Law, World War II to Present
Just as at the end of the First World War,
Internationalism seemed to be on the rise again follow-
ing World War II. The right of warships to transit
international straits became more clearly established
in the writings of some publicists. Oppenheim believed
that the right existed in both times of peace and war.
In time of peace: "Foreign men-of-war must be admitted
to such straits as form part of the highways for inter-
national traffic." In time of war:
. . . Has a belligerent a right to claim passage
of its men-of-war? To this it seems, the author's
answer would be: Yes, in case of such straits as
form part of the highways for international traffic
by connecting two open seas; and No, in the case of
other straits.
Juraj Andrassy, International Law and the
Resources of the Sea (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970), p. 45.
L. Oppenheim, International Law, 2 vols.
(London: Longmans, Green S Co., 1955), 1:511-512.
3 Ibid. , 2:696.
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Positive law supports this contention. Article
23e of the League Covenant was incorporated in Articles
43 and 104 of the United Nations Charter. 1 As noted
2when discussing the Wimbledon Case, the sovereign
rights of states over their territory can be modified
if the interests of the international community dictate
its necessity to insure world peace. Passage of war-
ships through international straits is clearly allowed
when it is functioning as an agent of the United
Nations. Its passage could not be barred merely on
3
the character of the ship alone.
One of the first cases brought before the
United Nation's International Court of Justice applied
directly to the passage of warships through inter-
national straits. On October 22, 1946 two British
warships struck mines while passing through the North
Corfu strait (see Appendix C) on what might be
Article 43 obligates states to allow passage
of UN forces through their territory. Article 104




This would seem to refute the claim of the
Strait and Archipelago States that the character of the
ship necessitates control over it.
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considered as a mission of gunboat diplomacy or "naval
presence .
"
The British claimed that Albania had mined an
international strait thereby impeding the passage of
shipping. Albania denied any such knowledge of the
mining and further stated that the strait was only of
minor importance and therefore did not belong to the
class of international straits. Further, the passage
of the warships was not "innocent" because it was meant
to be a show of force and therefore its sovereignty was
violated. The Court ruled:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally
recognized and in accordance with international
custom that States in time of peace have a right to
send their warships through straits used for inter-
national navigation between two parts of the high
seas without the previous authorization of a
coastal State, provided that the passage is inno-
cent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an inter-
national convention, there is no right for a
coastal State to prohibit such passage through
straits in time of peace.
Further
:
. . . The Court has arrived at the conclusion that
the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty
The ships were apparently sent to test the
attitude of the Albanian Government regarding the right
of warships to pass through the Straits. Earlier a
ship had been fired upon while passing through the
Strait.
2 Green, p. 260.
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of Albania by reason of the acts of the British
Navy in Albanian waters on October 22, 1946.
!
The practice of states since World War II
regarding passage of ships through international
straits can be illustrated by the events that sur-
rounded the 1956 seizure of the Straits of Tiran by
2Israel. The event dealt with the unimpeded passage
of merchant ships through the straits but is important
in that it, together with the judicial decision of the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Canal Case,
formed the positive law that was to emerge from the
First Law of the Sea Conference.
After the establishment of Israel as a State
in May, 1948, hostilities ensued with its Arab neigh-
bors. Egypt instigated visit and search procedures for
ships passing through the Straits leading to the
Israeli port of Elath. This was recognized as a right
of a belligerent in time of war. However, Egypt
continued these practices even after the Rhodes General
Armistice Agreement signed on February 29, 1949. This
interference with Israeli and other flag shipping pass-
ing through the Strait was continuously protested by
Israel on the basis that it violated international law.
1 Ibid.
,
p. 263. See p. 12

76
Egypt replied that, although an armistice had been
signed, a state of belligerency still existed between
the two states and that under international law it was
legally entitled to such action.
Egypt's actions continued until September of
1955. At that time Egypt began requiring any ship that
desired to transit the Strait to obtain permission 72
hours in advance. This action brought protests from
not only Israel, but from Britain and Jordan as well.
Finally, on October 29, 1956, Israel launched its
military offensive.
In the debates that followed the attack, Arab
countries advanced the position that Israel had no
legal right to a coast on the Gulf of Aqaba and that
the Gulf was historically an Arab sea. On this basis
the Strait of Tiran was not an international strait.
The maritime powers of the world disagreed and took the
side of Israel. The position of France was:
The French government considers that the Gulf
of Aqaba, by reason partly of its breadth and
partly of the fact that its shores belong to four
different States, constitutes international waters.
Consequently it believes, that, in conformity with
international law, freedom of navigation should be
insured in the Gulf and the straits which give
access to it. In these circumstances no nation has
1 Selak, p. 670-671
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the right to prevent the free and innocent passage
of ships whatever the nationality or type .^-
The judicial decision of the International
Court of Justice in the Corfu Canal Case and the prac-
tice of states in connection with the Gulf of Aqaba
action was carried over into positive international
law. Thi^ was reflected in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea, written at the United Nations First
2Law of the Sea Conference in 1958. Section III of
that Convention concerns itself with the right of
innocent passage, which we have seen has been inter-
preted most liberally by the International Court of
Justice. Article 14, paragraph 4 states:
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order and security of the
coastal State. Such Passage shall take place in
conformity with these articles and with other rules
of international law.
3
Such passage appears to be granted to both merchant
ships and warships of all states by Article 14, para-
graph 1 :
Ibid., p. 674. Italics mine.
2 Leo Gross, "The Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea and the right of innocent passage through
the Gulf of Aqaba," American Journal of International
Law 53 (July 1959): 564-594.
United Nations, Legislative Series, Legisla-
tion Relating to the Sea., p. 724.

Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships
of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the terri-
torial sea
.
Article 16, paragraph 3 protects the security of the
strait state by allowing it to suspend the right of
innocent passage to foreign ships which pass through
its territorial waters:
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the
coastal state may, without discrimination amongst
foreign ships , suspend temporarily in specified
areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage
of foreign ships if such a suspension is essential
for the protection of its security. Such suspen-
sion shall take effect only after having been duly
published
.
Such suspension must be honored by warships as stated
in the only article directed specifically to warships
,
Article 23:
If any warship does not comply with the regula-
tions of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance which is made of it, the
coastal state may require the warship to leave the
territorial sea.^
However, this right of suspension, whether applying to
warships or merchant ships is not given to a state
whose territorial waters are used for international
navigation. Article 16, paragraph 4 states:








There shall be no suspension of the right of
innocent passage of foreign ships through straits
that are used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas and another part of the
high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign
State. 1
Germane to the Archipelago States' argument is Section
II, Article 5, paragraph 2. That the right of innocent
passage through international waters that were formerly
high seas exists for warships is supported by the
specific reference to Article 23:
Where the establishment of a strait baseline in
accordance with article 4 has the effect of enclos-
ing as internal waters areas which previously had
been considered as part of the territorial sea or
of the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as
provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those
waters
.
The Shortcomings of the Law
There are four shortcomings to international
law as it presently applies to international straits.
First, it is indefinite as to when its provisions apply
and to which type of ships. Secondly, it is silent as
to the extent of the territorial sea, especially in the
case of international straits. Third, it does not








Fourth, it leaves the determination of innocence to
the subjective judgment of the littoral state.
The only distinction in the present law regard-
ing ship types is that between warships and merchant
ships. Strait States argue that another class be
added--"ships of special character." These ships, as
well as warships, could be denied passage through
international straits under the provisions of Article
223 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Maritime states
would argue that the character of the ship is not
important but rather the intent is the criteria to be
followed when determining the ship's passage presents
a threat to the coastal state. They could support this
position by citing the Corfu Canal Decision and Article
316 of the 1958 Convention.
Second , the law must still come to grips with
the problem of the extent of the territorial sea. It
does little good to establish passage rights through
the straits if the high seas at either end are elimi-
nated by expanding unilateral claims. It also must
face the problem of what to do with a strait that
1 See pp. 33-34. 2 See p. 78
3 See pp. 74 £ 79.

formerly had a strip of high seas through it but now,
through expanded claims to sovereignty, lies within
a state's territorial waters. A solution may lie in




Third , a clear statement must be made in regard
to the right of air and submerged transit through
international straits. Is such transit to be guaran-
teed to both commercial and military craft? Article 23
of the Lausanne Treaty could be cited in support , while
. . 2
the Montreux Convention could be cited m opposition.
Finally, "innocent passage" is a matter of
subjective judgment on the part of the coastal state.
This is a critical failing of the present law. When
determination of the innocence is the perogative of
the individual state, it is left to compete with the
state's concept of "national security." When the
"innocent" nature of such passage is decided in the
negative, loss of life can occur. This was illustrated
throughout history and most recently in the Corfu
Canal and the Strait of Tiran.
1 See p. 79.
2 See pp. 70-71.
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The need for retaining the principle of
"innocent passage" in the international law of straits
has been argued by opponents of unimpeded passage.
Only by so doing can the "existing balance of interests
between coastal and non-coastal states . . ."be main-
tained. What seems to be said here is that while the
coastal state is willing to support international law
it will not do so at the risk of losing possible polit-
ical leverage and thereby its security.
A basic weakness of the present international
law as it pertains to international straits is that its
basis is political rather than legal. While this is
necessary for agreement between sovereign states, it
allows for a number of different interpretations of
what the law says.
Summary
The trend in international law as it applies to
international straits is for the interests of the
international community, represented by an inter-
national organization, to take precedence over the
national security interests of the state. The trend is
not constant but rather coincides with the waxing and
1 See p. 33
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waning of Internationalism, which appears to be
strongest after great international conflicts.
It must be conceded that international law
only reflects political reality. Liberal interpreta-
tions applied to the passage through international
straits have been a reflection of the political
supremacy of maritime states over landlocked or coastal
states. Thus, while concluding that the trend in
international law would support the United States'
proposal for unimpeded passage, it is realized that the
trend has its base in the past political supremacy of
the maritime states.
In examining international law, it is quioxtic
that opponents of unimpeded passage prefer the present
doctrine of "innocent passage." The liberal interpre-
tation of "innocent passage" given by the international
Court of Justice would indicate that peacetime passage
of any ship, unless it actually committed a belligerent
act against the coastal state, is innocent. One con-
clusion is that the Strait States would prefer even
"'"While the trend for the straits is for inter-
nationalization, that for other ocean interests can and
do run at times in opposite directions. For example,





this small political advantage over the complete
freedom of navigation guaranteed by unimpeded passage.
The real concern for international opponents
of unimpeded passage is that it will give apparent
legal sanction to political reality. In so doing it
may indeed "alter the existing balance of interests
between coastal and non-coastal states , . . . " This
alteration, however, would only be in form and not sub-
stance. It would be a recognition of the overwhelming
power of the two nuclear superpowers, who are also
. . 2
maritime powers, over the coastal state.
To argue, as the littoral states have, that
recognition of such realities would be a weakening of
their "sovereignty" over their territorial waters and
thus their national security is questionable. First,
it does not recognize that these territorial waters
are, in some cases, unilateral extensions of sover-
eignty. Secondly, any claim to sovereignty over a
territory must, under international law, be supported
by control. Without maritime strength, control at sea
1 See p. 33.
It is recognized that other states, including
China, are nuclear capable. It is believed that the
two strongest nations in the world, when viewed in
terms of total resources, miJitary, and industrial
strength, remain that of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
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is impossible. Finally, in the present age of nuclear
deterrence, the national security of all states is
strongly dependent upon the relaxation of tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union through
mutuality of interests. In the case of the inter-
national straits, unimpeded passage is in the interest
of both countries.
The question was posed at the beginning of the
Chapter whether there is any reason to abandon the
policy for unimpeded passage when viewed in the context
of international law. The answer appears to be, NO!
Legally, the trend has been to support such passage.
Politically, it recognizes the coincidence of interests





Understanding requires theory; theory requires
abstraction; and abstraction requires the simpli-
fication and ordering of reality
.
Any attempt to simplify the many complex and
interrelated aspects of the law of the sea stands a
distinct chance of failure from the start. The subject
seems to defy disentanglement. This is especially true
in regard to the straits issue and national security
because it combines the ambiguity of international law
with the subjectivity of which elements should be
stressed when discussing national security. Still the
attempt must be made.
The following approach suggests itself. First,
the major areas of conflict will be indicated and the
arguments summarized. An arbitrary division has been
made between the domestic and international points of
conflict. In reality the two are interrelated.
Secondly, the arguments will be drawn together under a
theoretical framework.
-'"Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the
State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. vii.
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Domestic Points of Conflict
There are two areas of general discord over
domestic policy for the international straits. First,
should defense interests take primacy over the mineral
industry interests (including petroluem interests) in
the formation of national policy? Second, do naval
missions require unimpeded passage through international
straits?
Under the first area of general discord,
minerals versus defense interests
,
the arguments may be
summarized under three points of conflict. First,
does the adoption of unimpeded passage make naval
forces free from law or legal restraints as argued by
the mineral interests? Secondly, does the adoption of
the policy of unimpeded passage advocated by defense
condemn international agreement for the law of the sea
thereby preventing the exploitation of the seabed by
mineral interests? Finally, will defense interest
insistence upon umimpeded passage result in the
The arguments presented in the Staff Report to
the U.S. Senate's Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs and those of domestic critics have been col-
lapsed. The result is what has been labeled here the
"mineral interests" argument. While acknowledging the
dangers of such a method, it is believed that this is
the best way a synthesis of the issues can be achieved.
See pp. 28-29.

developing countries gaining control of seabed mining
and thus diminish U.S. security?
The mineral interests believe that the adoption
of unimpeded passage makes naval forces free from law
or legal restraints. They are supported in their posi-
tion in that replacing the provisions for "innocent
passage" weakens the amount of legal control that a
state may exercise in its territorial waters when they
form part of an international strait. In some cases,
this legal advantage is the only way any type of con-
trol may be exercised. This is especially true of
smaller countries without a sizable navy.
Defense interest would counter with the argu-
ment that "unimpeded passage" is not establishing any
new legal right but merely protecting those that are
presently enjoyed. It is because of the unilateral
extension of sovereignty by coastal states and the
requirement for international agreement on the breadth
of the territorial sea that the need for "unimpeded
passage" has become apparent. Formerly the straits
closed by extensions of sovereignty had avenues of high
seas through them. All that is being sought is the
same high seas freedom of navigation that was pre-
viously enjoyed. The legal restraints that were
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applied to shipping upon the high seas would continue
in force.
Further, defense interests could reason that
new legal advantages would be created for the littoral
states without the concept of "unimpeded passage."
Under the former high seas freedom which states exer-
cised, suspension of navigation by a coastal state was
not permitted. By replacing this freedom with "inno-
cent passage," navigation for warships might be denied.
Such denial could be on the basis that "innocent pas-
sage" is a term applied to territorial seas. Under
Article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea, warships may be denied passage through territorial
waters. Therefore, permitting the coastal state the
right to apply the concept of "innocent passage" to
former areas of high seas would be giving them a legal
right that previously was not theirs.
The second point of conflict between mineral
and defense interests follows from the first. If the
defense view is not legally sound, then international
opposition to it might cause failure to reach inter-
national agreement for a law of the sea.
In the mineral industry's judgment, adoption
of an internationally unacceptable policy of "unimpeded
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passage," as advocated by defense, will preclude inter-
national agreement for a law of the sea thereby fore-
stalling the exploitation of the seabed. The mineral
side is correct to the extent that Strait and Archi-
pelago States have certainly opposed the concept.
Additionally, when the concept was first introduced at
the U.N. Seabed Committee there was, in general, an
unfavorable reaction to it.
Also supporting the mineral industry's belief
that U.S. policy will delay agreement is the strong
correlation between international agreement to accept
the principle of unimpeded passage and U.S. willingness
2
to recognize extended claims to sovereignty. Without
insisting on unimpeded passage the chance for inter-
national agreement might be improved. A willingness to
negotiate on all interests could possibly be more help-
ful in reaching an early settlement concerning seabed
exploitation
.
The concept was first introduced as "free
transit." Because of the adverse reaction to the term,
it was decided to use "unimpeded passage." Lynch
interview. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee





2 See pp. 23-24.
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In countering the mineral industry's case,
defense interests could point to the complexity of the
issues and the need to establish priorities for a
negotiating position. There were over 100 agenda items
submitted for the Third Law of the Sea Conference. In
order for successful negotiations to take place, each
item must be ranked according to its importance in
fulfilling the needs of the country. To negotiate as
if all interests were equal would not be effective.
Defense interests could advocate that the
mineral industry is dissatisfied with negotiating
priorities rather than legalities. Mineral interests
mainly object to their subordination to the nation's
traditional requirements for maximum mobility upon the
sea. They seek to change the priorities of the nego-
tiating list. These were established after due con-
sideration of the interests involved was made by the
highest civilian leadership.
The defense argument could continue by pointing
out that the success or failure of a law of the sea
conference is often a matter of subjective judgment
based upon expectations. States have been seeking a
successful international law of the sea for at least
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the last 300 years. To expect a single conference to
resolve all disputes is unrealistic. All that might be
hoped for under the circumstances is a better under-
standing of the issues and the establishment of a
mechanism by which some of the less substantive issues
might be resolved. It is an over-simplification to
attribute the failure to reach agreement on any single
issue
.
Defense interest could question if failure to
reach international agreement would necessarily mean
impeding seabed exploitation. It could be reasoned
that seabed extraction would continue under the present
Geneva Convention for the Continental Shelf. Under
this Convention, states have the right to exploit the
seabeds as far out as their technology allows.
Finally, defense could argue that it is not
clear if the concept of unimpeded passage would be
overwhelmingly opposed. The defense interest could
point to the support from other developed maritime
nations, most notably the Soviet Union. Further, an
analysis of the agenda items submitted for the Third
Law of the Sea Conference shows that the majority of
1Wolfgang Saxon, "A Complete Law of the Sea Has
Eluded Nations for 300 Yrs
.
,




the countries expressed no specific opinion on the
strait issue.
The final disagreement between the mineral
interest and defense interest concerns the mineral view
that defense interests would negotiate mineral rights
in exchange for support of "unimpeded passage." In so
doing, control of mineral rights would be given to
developing countries which could result in diminished
U.S. security.
Supporting the contention of the mineral indus-
try is the natural inclination of the military to
advance pure military interest above all others. Of
immediate concern to the military would be the ability
to move naval units without interference.
It could be contended by the mineral interests
that control over the seabed resources might play a
more important role in national security than military
mobility. This line of reasoning is borne out by the
ever increasing U.S. dependency on imported petroleum
2
to supplement U.S. production. Also, the sea could
Most of the states submitted articles on the
territorial seas rather than the straits themselves.
United Nations, General Assembly, 28th Session, Report
of the Sea-Bed Committee , vol. 5.
2 See p. 18.
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supply a substantial amount of certain raw materials
that must now be imported.
The defense position could use the same argument
of increasing imports to emphasize the doubt that the
U.S. would ever meet its own needs for raw materials
solely from domestic sources, even if it exploited the
seabed deposits. Therefore, mineral rights could be
negotiated. It has already been noted that the U.S. is
dependent on 7 of the 13 raw materials considered
2
essential to industrial health. By the end of this
century it will require 12 of 13 raw materials to be
3imported. The requirement to cooperate with develop-
ing countries is necessary and likely to grow.
In order to defend their own primacy in national
policy, defense could stress the need for "unimpeded
passage" for shipping. They could reason that any
resources exploited either by developed or developing
countries will require ships. Shipping provides the
most economical means to move bulk material especially
when employing the most direct routes (through inter-
national straits in many cases). Shipping must be
1 2See p. 55. See p. 56.
3 Lester R. Brown, World Without Borders (New
York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 194.
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protected during hostilities. Therefore, shipping and
naval missions, which require mobility upon the sea,
must take precedence over the actual mining of the
seabed regardless which country does the exploitation.
This last discord between defense and minerals
interests leads into the second area of domestic dis-
agreement. Do defense interests actually require
unimpeded passage to exercise missions? Two points
underpinning this question are: First, is unimpeded
passage required for a credible nuclear deterrence
posture; second, do traditional naval missions require
unimpeded passage?
Those who do not believe that unimpeded passage
is required for nuclear deterrence would contend that
even if nuclear submarines are not allowed to pass
through international straits it is possible to posi-
tion the submarines by circumnavigating the straits.
Further, new missiles with increased ranges will make
it unnecessary to use the straits to accomplish their
mission. Finally, the nuclear submarine is not the
only means available for a second strike. There may
still be land based ICBMs as well as air deployed
nuclear weapons to provide the needed deterrence.
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The counter side to the view that unimpeded
passage is not required for nuclear deterrence is that
such passage would insure maximum use of all areas of
the high seas. This would make submarine detection a
difficult task thereby assuring continued deterrence.
The more sea-room available for maneuver, if coupled
with longer range SLBMs, would further assure that
deterrent configured submarines could evade attack
submarines while still remaining within launch range of
their targets.
The argument could also cite the need for
safety. Unimpeded passage would allow the nuclear
submarine to transit international straits in a stable,
submerged condition.
A final reason to support the need for unim-
peded passage in nuclear deterrence is that it could
limit the number of countries involved in the problem
of deterrence. Unimpeded passage would preclude the
involvement of littoral states, thereby reducing the
scope and complexity of the problem.
The second aspect of this area of debate con-
cerns the requirement of unimpeded passage through
straits for traditional naval missions. The doubt for
such need could be expressed as follows: peacetime
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gunboat diplomacy (now called "naval presence") is not
an effective way to protect a country's interests, but
rather has the opposite effect. For example: what
evidence was there that Task Force 74 had any affect on
the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, other than increasing
India's hostility to the U.S.? Further, by insisting
upon the right to unimpeded passage we might be alien-
ating more countries than could be influenced through
naval presence. This could increase tensions thereby
reducing peace and security.
To answer these charges it might be asserted
by proponents of traditional naval missions that in the
Indo-Pakistan War, naval presence countered that of
Soviet Union's. It is equally easy to speculate that
the presence may have prevented India from attempting
to completely invade West Pakistan.
Another case which supports unimpeded passage
for traditional naval missions is the utility of these
missions in both war and peace. Military protection of
shipping in war is a self-evident requirement which
is fulfilled by the traditional naval mission of sea
control. Sea control is hampered if straits become
1 See p. 49
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neutral waters in which sea control (i.e., attacks on
shipping) cannot be exercised. However, it is too late
to initiate ship construction when sea control becomes
an actual necessity. The warship must already be in
existence. This peacetime necessity for warships can
be used as an effective adjunct to diplomacy. Naval
presence can be utilized to underscore a nation's
interest in an area without involving it in an "in
country" commitment. Denial of unimpeded passage may
close off areas of the sea within which this mission
might be exercised; for example, the Red Sea, Persian
Gulf, and even the Mediterranean.
In testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs ' Subcommittee on the Near East and
South Asia, the Honerable J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr. indi-
cated the importance of naval visits to diplomacy: "As
one who has spent his adult lifetime in the foreign
service, I know myself the utility of having a naval
visit. When you have a ship of your country come into
a port and you can invite the mayor and the Governor
down to come aboard and go through the ship, and you
can have the band come ashore and give a concert, and
the kids can go on board and eat ice cream cones, the
people in the city and in the country can have a feel-
ing that the United States is interested in us and it is
here. I know the value of this kind of visit. ..."
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the
Indian Ocean, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the




A thin thread could be seen uniting the various
points of conflict on the domestic level--the status quo
versus change. Applied to the need for the nuclear
deterrence mission and the traditional missions of the
navy for unimpeded passage, it could be seen to reflect
the reluctance of relinquishing the known advantage of
high seas freedom to pass through the international
straits for some unknown situation where in the littoral
state controls the passage. This change versus the
status quo is also in evidence in the dispute of defense
needs versus mineral needs . The concept of "unimpeded
passage" would give legal protection to the rights
enjoyed before the changes in claims of sovereignty
over the straits. The point of conflict over the
unattainability of unimpeded passage indicates that the
superpowers have united together to protect the status
quo of their maritime supremacy. Additionally, it
draws out the point that the mineral industry is seek-
ing to change negotiating priorities thereby expanding
its own influence in law of the sea matters. Finally,
though contrary to the general trend, the fear by the
mineral industry that adoption of unimpeded passage
would sacrifice U.S. interests to developing countries
is a fear to change the present status quo whereby
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developed countries hold the advantage. Defense
interests, while acknowledging the need for future
cooperation, still maintain their traditional emphasis
on the need for shipping and its protection.
International Points of Conflict
Four lines of argument can be identified in
connection with international opposition to unimpeded
passage. First, unimpeded passage is unknown to state
practice. Second, unimpeded passage would derogate the
sovereignty of the coastal state. Third, unimpeded
passage would change the "balance of interests ..."
between maritime and coastal states. Finally, unitarian
treatment should be applied to the sea.
Is unimpeded passage unknown to state practice?
This has been touched upon when discussing the domestic
conflict over the legality of unimpeded passage. It
was pointed out that unimpeded passage was a new term
in international law made necessary by extensions of
sovereignty in international straits. It might be added
here that by examining international law it was seen
that the overall trend was to support the passage, even
of warships, through international straits. The objec-
tion of littoral states would be the recognition of
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this reality by establishing it as a principle of
international law.
Would unimpeded passage derogate the sovereignty
of the coastal state? In principle it would. This is
true if sovereignty is defined as the supreme decision-
making and decision-enforcing authority within a state's
territory. Unimpeded passage would allow shipping to
pass through a territory without it being under the
control of the state.
International opponents to unimpeded passage
could cite the need for more, rather than less state
control over coastal waters. The new character of
ships presents greater danger to the littoral states.
Supertankers are a heretofore unknown pollution threat
.
The counter argument could be that a state can-
not exercise sovereignty over an area that it does not
control. Unilateral declarations to extended sover-
eignty are not sufficient for the area to become a
recognized territory of the sovereign state under inter-
national law.
Supporters for unimpeded passage could reason
that states do not necessarily need jurisdiction over
the sea to protect themselves from the dangers of new
technology. International organizations already exist
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for such protection. Stricter measures against ocean
pollution are being written by the Inter-governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization of the United
Nations .
The third argument is that unimpeded passage
would change the "balance of interests . . . . " This
might be true in a legal sense. As indicated prior,
the present political realities would be incorporated
into international law.
Supporters of unimpeded passage would contend
that there is little, if any, shifting of interests.
Maritime states enjoy practically complete freedom of
passage even under the concept of "innocent passage."
By removing the ambiguity of what is "innocent,"
freedom to navigate the seas in international straits
would be clear and one source of world tension removed.
The final area of conflict is that between the
Strait and Archipelago States' concept of unitarian
treatment of the sea, particularly territorial waters,
versus the functional division of the ocean as advo-
2
cated by the developed countries, particularly the U.S.
^See p. 15.
7
The unitarian approach is to divide the sea
into areas primarily based on the degree of sovereignty
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The unitarian approach has the advantage of simplicity
to recommend it. All territorial waters, for example,
whether along an open coast or in a strait, would be
treated in the same manner.
The opposing position would be that the func-
tional approach has been the long established practice
exercised within that area. In high seas areas no state
may claim sovereignty over the sea, seabed, living or
non-living resources, or the air space above. In ter-
ritorial seas a state has complete sovereignty except
with respect to rights of ships to navigate through
them. These ships have been granted the right of "inno-
cent passage" so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace and security of the coastal state. The littoral
state has the right to suspend such passage but it must
apply the suspension to all ships without discrimina-
tion. Inland seas are the third area. The same sover-
eignty is exercised here as on land. Special uses of
the ocean are not recognized under the unitarian
approach.
A functional approach to ocean uses emphasizes
the same subdivision of the ocean as mentioned for the
unitarian approach but superimposes upon these a func-
tional separation of the uses of the ocean. By doing
this, a multitude of uses of the sea may be enjoyed
without the extension of sovereignty necessitated by
the unitarian approach. For example, State A wants to
protect its fisheries from overfishing by other states
.
Its coastline is along an international strait whose
width is 30 miles across. State A proclaims a 15 mile
territorial sea, her neighbor across the strait does
the same and international objections from maritime
states begin to follow. On the other hand, State A
could have used the functional approach by maintaining
its present territorial sea limits (perhaps 3 miles) but
declaring 12 mile contiguous special purpose zone for
fishing. Now they would be faced with the objections of
only those countries that fished those waters rather
than all maritime interests. The net results for State





of states for ocean uses. Territorial sea limits have
been disassociated from such uses as fishing, customs,
and air defense. Because of the multiplicity of issues,
approaching them on a functional basis seems to offer
the best chance of agreement between states. By using
such an approach, both coastal and maritime interests
may be protected. Unimpeded passage recognizes the
special function that international straits serve for
international communications whereas innocent passage
does not.
As in the case of the domestic points of con-
flict, it may be helpful to view the international
conflicts in terms of the status quo versus change.
First, in connection with the view that unimpeded
passage through international straits is unknown to
state practice—this could be seen as an effort to
change the high seas freedoms enjoyed in international
straits to one of control by the coastal state.
Secondly, the argument that unimpeded passage may
derogate the sovereignty of the coastal state could be
viewed as an effort to change present international
law, which requires effective control over an area
before sovereignty can be claimed, to one of a more
liberal interpretation. The fear regarding the change
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of the present balance of interest is actually concern
over the further establishment of the status quo into
international law by the concept of unimpeded passage.
Finally, the status quo method of dealing with ocean
issues has been through the use of a functional separa-




Samuel Huntington stated that "No theory can
explain all facts. ..." But perhaps theory can
assist in understanding a portion of the conflicts
involved in the straits and security issue.
Hans Morganthau has espoused the "realist
theory" of politics which concerns itself with "human
nature as it actually is" not as it should be. Accord-
ing to Morganthau, politics is best understood if we
look at political actions in terms of interests
defined as power. Power being "man's control over the
minds and actions of other men." According to
Morganthau, "Domestic and international politics are
but two different manifestations of the same phenomenon
2
the struggle for power." Further:
1Huntington
,
p. vii. Morganthau, p. '(
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All politics, domestic and international,
reveals three basic patterns; that is all politicalphenomena can be reduced to one of three basic
types. A political policy seeks either to keeppower, to increase power, or to demonstrate power. 1
A policy that seeks to keep power is called a
policy of the "status quo." That which aims to increase
power is one which Morganthau defines as "imperialism"
but is less confusing here if identified as the "policy
for change." A "policy of prestige" is one that seeks
to demonstrate power.
Morganthau, when addressing the subject of
ideologies associated with the various power patterns,
believes that those who practice a policy of the
"status quo" will often use pacifist terms as well as
invoking international law. "Peace" is a favorite
word to advocates of the "status quo" because by
avoiding war they can maintain the advantages they
presently enjoy. International law is also a favorite
ideological device employed because it recognizes the
present distribution of power.
The practitioners of the "policy for change"
often cite the requirement of "justice," "anti-
imperialism," and "equality," which Morganthau equates




Such a paradigm fits well with the events we
have seen in connection with national security and the
international straits. Instead of stating that defense
interests or national security interests have dictated
what U.S. policy should be in connection with the law
of the sea, if it was asserted that the policy of the
"status quo" had been adopted, the facts would tend to
support it. The mineral industry (including petroleum)
could be seen as adopting an increasing power pattern
or the "policy for change" by seeking to extend their
power on the domestic level by challenging the tradi-
tional primacy of naval and shipping interests in ocean
uses
.
Morganthau's concepts are even more inviting
when they are applied on the international level. Here
it seems plainly evident that the United States has
adopted the policy of the "status quo" for the use of
international straits. On the other side, the Strait
and Archipelago States are concerned with "equality"
and "sovereignty," ideologies associated with the
"policy for change." It is logical for these States to
Fishing, although a traditional use, is not
considered here because the industry is split on which
is most desirable--state control or freedom from state
control of the sea.

108
do so because they could improve their political power
by changing the "status quo" in regard to freedom of
passage
.
At first appearance , there is at least one item
which does not seem to be explained by the realist
theory when applied to the straits issue. Why have the
Strait and Archipelago States sought sanction of their
position by international law when this would be a
typical tactic of the status quo nation? A reply
might be: because the present law is imprecise and
allows a variety of interpretations including one that
is favorable to the opponents of unimpeded passage.
Conclusion
The primacy of unimpeded passage in U.S. policy
for the international law of the sea can best be
understood as a maintenance of the political "status
quo." This is true for both U.S. domestic politics as
well as international politics. On the domestic level,
it recognizes the traditional primacy of naval and
shipping interests in law of the sea matters. It also
appears to be in the best interests of U.S. security
because it guarantees freedom of navigation to shipping
while allowing the U.S. to exercise its naval strength
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in both deterrent and traditional naval missions.
Although argued to the contrary, placing primacy on
unimpeded passage would not necessarily mean a deroga-
tion of other U.S. interests in the sea. On the inter-
national level, the policy of unimpeded passage
recognizes the coincidence of Soviet and American
interests and in so doing serves to lessen tensions and
increases the security of all nations.
For the present, unimpeded passage through
international straits appears to be in the best interest
of the United States because it realistically reflects
political power. It recognizes the traditional
importance of shipping and its protection for a nation
of world trade.
Unimpeded passage, again because it realisti-
cally reflects political power, appears to be in the
best interest of world peace. In attempting to maintain
the "status quo" it emphasizes the avoidance of war.
Caution must be exercised in the policy of
unimpeded passage. Awareness must be kept for changing
power relationships. This is particularly true of the
developing nations possessing vital resources. These
represent the forces for change and their growing
political power must be continually evaluated. The
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forces for change must be accommodated if in so doing
an overall relaxation of world tensions can be achieved
and the security of all nations advanced.
Areas for Further Study
This study has been made on the basis of docu-
ments available prior to the convening of the Third Law
of the Sea Conference. Primary sources covering the
Conference have, as yet, not been made available. A
thorough evaluation of this material must be made in
order to determine if there is serious opposition to
the concept of unimpeded passage from the growing number
of more powerful developing countries. Morganthau has
cautioned that awareness of relative power must be
maintained. Failure to do this has involved nations in
two world wars this century. If such changes have
occurred during the Third Law of the Sea Conference,
accommodation would be in order if the net effect would
be to reduce world tensions.
Technological advances must be continuously
appraised as to their effect on the straits issue. This
is especially true as it applies to the military neces-
sity of such transit. Foremost in mind is the recent
launch of an ICBM from an aircraft. Further development
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of this form of deterrent would weaken the case for the
need of extensive ocean areas to maintain the assured
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Relationship of Sea Terms
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Sovereignty of the Sea
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of fice , 1969
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SOURCE: U.S., Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Sovereignty of the Sea,
pp. 28-29.
Entrance to Hudson Strait between Resolution
Island and Button Islands (off Labrador Coast), 37
miles
.
Distance between Bimini (Bahamas) and Florida,
43 miles.
3Distance given in table is that between Big
Diomede Island (U.S.S.R.) and Mainland Siberia. Other
distances: (1) Between Little Diomede Island (U.S.) and































United Kingdom 2 9
United Kingdom 26
United Kingdom 3 9
United Kingdom 3 5
Cuba/Haiti 4 5
United Kingdom 13
United Kingdom 2 3





Island and Mainland Alaska, 20 miles. (3) Between
Mainland Alaska and Mainland Siberia, 45 miles.
Distance given is that from Contoy an island
about 6 miles off the Yucatan coast.
Distance between Great Abaco Island and Royal
Island, off Eleuthera coast, 26 miles.
6 Distance between Acklins Island and Plana Cays,
12 miles; between Plana Cays and Mayaguana Island, 21
miles
.
Distance given in table is from Culebrita, an
inlet east of Culebra.
8 Distance between Sombrero and Horse Shoe Reef,
a breaking reef running southeast of Anegada and













Dragon ' s Mouth
Serpent ' s Mouth
Aruba-Paraguana
Passage












































































































Distance given in table is between mainlands;
between South Bishop Rock (Wales) and Tuskar Rock
(Ireland), 36 miles.
10 Between Shiant Island and mainland of
Scotland, 17 miles.
Between Pentland Skerries and mainland of
Scotland, 4 miles. Stroma Island, which also lies in
Pentland Firth, is not considered in the computation.
Distance given in table approximately correct;































































13 Distance between Hokkaido and Ostrov Kamen
'
Opasnosti, 20 miles; on to Sakhalin, 9 miles.
14Measured from island off the coast of Korea.





































































16 Distance between Luzon and Verde Island, 3
Distance between Mindoro to Apo Reef, 15
18^.Distance given in table is that measured
between Balabac, largest of the major islands south of
Palawan, and Balambangan , closest of the major islands
of Sabah.

































































9 n Distance given in table is that measured
across Macclesfield Strait portion of Gaspar Strait.
Distance from Sumatra to Berhala, in middle
























































2 2 Distance given in table is that measured
between Malaita and Nura Islands, the latter 10 miles
from Guadalcanal
.
2 3 Distance between Centre Island (4 miles off
South Island) and Stewart Island at west end of strait,
13 miles. At east end of strait the recommended chan-
nel for ships between Dog Island on the north and
Ruapuke on the south, the channel is 11 miles wide.
2t4
Distance given in table is between mainlands;
between Perim Island and African continent, 11 miles;
















The Gulf of Aqaba








The Breadth of the Territorial Sea1
































SOURCE: U.S., Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Sovereignty of the Sea,
pp. 28-29.
"'"As claimed by selected states in nautical miles
unless otherwise indicated. One nautical mile equals











































Korea, Republic of 3
Kuwait 12
Lebanon N - A -


























(Panama Canal Zone) 3












3Waters within baselines joining appropriate
points of the outermost islands are considered internal
waters; waters between these baselines and the treaty
























Trinidad and Tobago 3
Tunisia 4 6
Turkey 6










^Follows the 50-meter isobath for part of the





Since the end of World War II, nations have
tended to extend their sovereignty to areas of the sea
that were previously res communis . This extension of
sovereignty when exercised by states located on straits
used for international commerce or by states that were
archipelagic in nature produced conflict between mari-
time nations and littoral states. The maritime states,
especially the U.S. and the Soviet Union, have argued
that "unimpeded passage" through international straits
is needed for national security. First, this passage
allows for the continued exercise of naval missions
such as nuclear deterrence. Secondly, "unimpeded pas-
sage" assures non-interference with shipping. The
littoral states desire more control over ships passing
their coasts. They cite such dangers to their security
as oil pollution and nuclear hazards
.
The policy of placing "unimpeded passage" as a
primary element in U.S. national policy for the law of
the sea has been attacked domestically. U.S. opponents,
particularly the seabed extractive industry, believe
that such a policy represents a subjugation of more
important interests to that of Department of Defense
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interests. They argue that national security could be
weakened by failure for international agreement as to
ocean uses.
The thesis of the paper is that national secur-
ity interests of America and the peace of the world are
best served through "unimpeded passage" of international
straits. The thesis is advanced by setting forth the
U.S. policy, the objections to that policy, and the
facts supporting that policy. Special emphasis is
placed on an examination of the trends in international
law as well as the military necessity for the policy.
A synthesis is made of the points of conflict in an
attempt to join the facts with political theory.
The primacy of "unimpeded passage" in U.S.
policy for the international law of the sea can best be
understood as a maintenance of the political "status
quo." This is true for both U.S. domestic politics as
well as international politics. For the present,
"unimpeded passage" through international straits
appears to be in the best interest of the United States
and for the peace of the world, because it realistically
reflects political power. Caution must be maintained
in such a policy. Technology may eliminate the military
need for such passage. Awareness must be kept of the
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increasing power of developing countries with vital
resources. These are the forces for change and their
growing political power must be continually evaluated
so that an overall reduction of tension can be achieved
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